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This thesis, entitled: "The U.S.-ROK Security Relations:
Their Implications for the Future of Korea," reviews the
development of the U.S.-ROK relationship through three
distinct periods; until the end of the Korea War; from the
Korean War to President Carter's assumption of office; and
during the Carter Administration. In the light of the ex-
plosive strategic environment in Northeast Asia, the
hypothesis is examined that the mutual interests of South
Korea and the United States demand that the stability of
South Korea and the continuous undiminished U.S. commitment
to South Korea's security are essential for the protection
and progress of their mutual interests. An in-depth analysis
of both political and strategic implications involving such
issues as a phased U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea, a North-
South non-aggression pact, a multilateral guarantee of Korea's
neutrality, and a cross-recognition of North and South Korea
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The United States served as a midwife at the birth of
the Republic of Korea in 19^-8 and fought for its survival
when North Korea launched its attack in 1950* The United
States has continued to assume a special relationship with
South Korea to share heavy burden of responsibility for the
defense of South Korea. American involvement in the Korea War
led to the beginning of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
in 195^- Under this treaty, the United States has con-
tinued to deploy its combat troops there, thus helping to
deter North Korea from launching another armed invasion.
More than a quarter of a century after the termination
of the Korea War, Korea is still technically at war. This is
evident from the cold war pattern still intact on the Korean
peninsula where more than one-million armed troops face
each other across the Demilitarized Zone.
Despite many fundamental changes in the general
international scene in recent years, relations between the
two Koreas are still marked by deep-rooted animosity, dis-
trust and suspicion.
Given the hostilities on both sides of the DMZ and
conflicting interests of the Great Powers, the possibility of re-
newed conflict cannot be ruled out. President Carter was
entirely aware of this situation when he assumed office

in 1977. However, in 1977. President Carter, citing South
Korean economic growth and many recent fundamental changes
in the international scene, announced the decision to con-
tinue the policy of withdrawal of U.S. combat troops which
was begun in 1970. At the same time, he emphasized that the
Korean armed forces should be modernized and the global
deployment of the U.S. forces should be reexamined to provide
a maximum degree of mutual security for both the ROK and the
United States. Of special concern to the people of the ROK
is what effect this decision will have on the Korean
peninsula. Whether or not this decision will enhance the
possibilities of war, what will be the precise nature of
constitutional processes as defined in the Mutual Defense
Treaty, are matters of controversy.
This paper will make an in-depth analysis of these issues
from all points of view and highlight implications of various
alternative scenarios for the future of Korea.
On the surface, the military situation on the Korean
peninsula has been stable since the conclusion of the Korean
War; underneath the surface, the condition of hostility has
persisted. At the same time, the global confrontation between
the Soviet Union and the Communist supporters on the one hand,
and the United States and its friends and allies on the other,
has continued. The effects of the Carter announcement must be
examined in the light of these two fundamental facts.
8

It is my hypothesis that the total package of U.S.
policy toward Korea, 1) phased withdrawal of U.S. combat
troops; and 2) expedited modernization of the Korea armed
forces, will have a profound effect on U.S.-ROK relations.
These effects will be examined from a military and psycho-
logical point of view as perceived by different groups
within the ROK. It is anticipated that my research will
expose the nearly unanimous opposition on the part of South
Koreans to the directions in American policy under President
Carter.
Because of this critical Korean reception of Carter's
policies, this writer wishes to examine whether 1) the timing
of the Carter announcement was appropriate; or 2) whether it
contributes to accomplishment of peace, stability and
unification. This writer also examines other alternatives
such as a North-South non-aggression pact; a multilateral
guarantee of neutrality of the Korean peninsula; a cross
recognition of North and South Korea and a possible 4-power or
6-power conference.

II. THE U.S.-ROK SECURITY RELATIONS
A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In strategic and geopolitical terms Korea is one of the
most sensitive areas in the world. Situated at a crossroads
of Its stronger neighbors—China, Japan and Russia, it has
been subjected to foreign interference and control throughout
much of its modern history. How deep Korea's destiny was
interwined with the Northeast Asian power conflict between
these powerful neighbors is evident from the Sino -Japanese
War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 190^-05, both of
which were fought over the control of the Korean peninsula.
Even before the dawn of the present century, Korea
found itself indulging in weakness, playing the three
stronger neighbors off against one another. At the same
time, Japan, inspired by the military strength of the Western
powers, was bent upon modernizing the country under the
slogan of Hukoku Kyohei, "a wealthy nation, strong army."
At the turn of the present century, Japan saw Korea as a
dagger pointed at its heart. China regarded Korea as a
buffer zone shielding it from an external invasion, and
Russia regarded Korea as a springboard for its expansion
toward warm waters in the Pacific.
Korea has never provoked any one of its neighbors. Yet,
it has not been left alone in peace. Korea by itself has
10

never become a threat to anyone. It becomes a threatening
dagger for Japan when it falls into the hands of China or
Russia. However, it becomes a stepping stone for Japan
or Russia when it falls into their hands. Korea's geo-
graphical proximity to these big neighbors and its strategic
location made it a victim of log-rolling international
power politics in East Asia. Thus, it was the sad fate of
Korea to have become a perennial battleground between
these stronger neighbors the three quarters of a century
ago. For a weak Korea, there was no way out of this
predicament.
As a result of Japan's overwhelming military victory
over Russia in 1905> Japan made secure its strategic position
in Korea and Korea became the target in a new kind of
international conflict. In the Katsura-Taft secret agreement
on July 29, 1905. "the United States approved Japan's
paramouncy of interest in Korea in return for her disavowal
1
of any aggresive intensions toward the Philippines." Japan
then proceeded with its plans to establish a protectorate
over Korea.
Following this understanding, Japan annexed Korea in
1910 without any formal protest from the United States.
Kyung Cho Chung in his Korea Tomorrow states:
....the United States raised no objection to Japan's
interest in Korea, in return for Japan's promise to
stay out of the Philippines. All of the Western powers
in the Pacific were hopeful that Japan would provide a
permanent' block against' Russian expansion toward the
Pacific; in addition, they expected Japan to be so
11

occupied with her northward expansion that a southward
advance would "be impossible. 2
From the U.S. viewpoint, the acceptance of Japanese
hegemony over Korea was part of the price the United States
had to pay for Japanese acceptance of the Open-Door policy.
The U.S. policy appeared to be justified in terms of world
peace and status quo in East Asia.
1 . The Wartime Agreement in Cairo and Yalta
Though Korea was eclipsed from the world atlas, many
Korean patriots at home and abroad kept alive their ardent
desires for Korean independence. Korean exiles in the
United States and China, who had maintained a provisional
government of Korea following the 1919 independence movement,
began to publicize the case for Korean independence and
official recognition, but they received little more than
expressions of sympathy.
The question regarding the future of Korea was discussed
for the first time at the White House between President
Roosevelt and Anthony Eden on March 27, 19^3* President
Roosevelt suggested that "Korea might be placed under an
international trusteeship, with China, the United States and
one or two other countries participating. " The reaction
was instant. Syngman Rhee, chairman of the Korean Commission
in the United States, was alarmed by this. In his letter
addressed to President Roosevelt in May 19^3, Rhee urged him
"to rectify the wrong and injustice done to the Korean people
and their nation during the last 38 years, "-5 blaming the
12

United States for allowing Japan "to occupy Korea in 1905 and
annex Korea in 1910, all in violation of the American-Korean
treaty of 1882." Rhee reminded President Roosevelt of "the
danger of Russian expansion in the Far East, so feared and
dreaded by the United States 40 years ago." Rhee warned:
"If the American statesmen fail to realize this fact, the
postwar settlements will leave the way open for another and
Q
even greater disaster than the present world conflagration.
"
He urged recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea
in Chungking, China, anticipating that "the Korean divisions
trained and maintained by the Soviet government as a part of
the Soviet Far Eastern army will be used by Soviet Russia
eventually to invade Korea and to set up a Soviet republic
o
there, affiliated with the U.S.S.R. However, the United
States totally ignored all of his warnings. Even China, who
always wanted to see Korea independent, showed a lukewarm
attitude toward the question of recognition primarily because
of disunity among the members of the Provisional Government
of Korea in China.
Korea, reentered the limelight of world history during
World War II, when its struggle for independence was given
formal recognition on December 1, 19^3 > by representatives
of the United States, Great Britain, and China in a joint
statement issued in Cairo. In the statement, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and
Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared that the United
States, China and the United Kingdom, "mindful of the
13

enslavement of the people of Korea," are determined 'that
11
in due course Korea shall become free and independent."
This statement constituted an epoch-making event marking a
dramatic turning point in U.S. -Korean relations. In it, the
United States made not only a formal commitment to Korean
independence before the whole world, it also assumed a
leading role of deciding the future destiny of Korea.
In retrospect, from the Korean viewpoint, the unfortu-
nate phrase "in due course" was totally unacceptable. The phrase
was regarded as cold water poured into the burning desire
of the Koreans for immediate independence following the
termination of the war.
In preparing for the Yalta Conference, the State
Department drew up a number of briefing book papers, including
one on Korea's postware legal status which indicated that
"military operations and subsequent occupation in Korea
by any single state alone might have far-reaching political
12
consequences." Since the State Department was aware of
the traditional interests of both China and the Soviet Union
in Korean affairs, it stressed the importance and necessity
of joint action by interested powers for military operations
and subsequent occupation. As for post-occupation periods,
the Statement Department supported Roosevelt's concept that
an international trusteeship be established "until such time
as the Koreans are able to govern themselves." J
Ik

The State Department suggested that with- the completion
of military operations in Korea, there should be "Allied
representation in the army of occupation and in military
government in Korea" and that "such representation should
be by those countries which have a real interest in the
future of Korea, such as the United States, Great Britain,
China and the Soviet Union if it has entered the war in the
Ik
Pacific."
Foreseeing the serious consequences of territorial
division by interested powers, the State Department added
that "such military government should be organized on the
principle of centralized administration with all of Korea
1 *>
administered as a single unit and not as separate zones." y
The State Department strongly felt that following a period
of occupation and prior to Korean Independence, "an interim
international administration or trusteeship should be
established for Korea under the authority of the projected
1 6international organization or independent of it." The
State Department also felt that "it would seem advisable
to have Soviet representation on an interim international
administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet
17Union enter the war in the Pacific."
Thus, a briefing book paper focused on the question of
"Allied representation, in the military occupation and in an
interim international administration of trusteeship. But
the State Department had not yet decided what powers should
15

actually participate in the military occupation and in an
interim international administration or trusteeship. Yet it
anticipated that the Soviet Union "will wish to participate
1 8
in the military occupation of Korea" even without its
participation in the Pacific war. While the State Department
was strongly in favor of Soviet participation in post-war
Korean affairs, it held the view that "an agreement must
be reached at an early date among the principal interested
19powers" 7 on the question of which powers should be
represented in an interim international administration.
At Yalta, it was agreed as a modus vivendi . not a part
of the official agreement, that Korea should be placed under
an international trusteeship. This is evident from the
following conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin:
He said he had in mind a trusteeship composed of a
Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said
the only true experience the United States had in this
matter was in the Philippines, where it had taken about
fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-
government. He held that in the case of Korea, the
period might be from twenty to thirty years. Marshall
Stalin said the shorter the period the better, and he in-
quired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in
Korea. The president replied in the negative, to which
Marshall Stalin expressed approval. The President then said
there was no question in regard to Korea which was delicate.
He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the
British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but
he held that they might resent this. Marshall Stalin
replied that they would most certainly be offended. In
fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us." 20
The question is why Roosevelt and Stalin did not con-
clude a formal agreement on Korea. What is known is the fact
21that "this was an unusual arrangement with no parallel." In
16

retrospect, had Roosevelt been more keenly aware of the
historical nature of the Korean question, and had he reached
a concrete, formal agreement at Yalta with a view to stifling
Soviet's ambition for Korea, the United States certainly might
have avoided the artificial division of Korea six months
later.
2. The Development of a Divided Korea
The Russian ambition for a division of Korea has deep
historical roots. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese war,
Rosen, the Russian Minister in Tokyo, proposed in 1903 to
Japan that "the portion of Korea north of the 39th parallel
22be designed as a neutral zone" to secure Russian
interest in Manchuria. Japan turned it down and the Russo-
Japanese War settled the issue. Russia was defeated and its
ambition for a division of Korea did not materialize. This
attests to the fact that Japan was as eager as Russia to
secure a dominant position in Korea.
At a Potsdam military staff meeting on July 2k, 19^5
»
less than one month before the termination of the war in the
Pacific, the Soviet side once again showed its interest in
Korea, asking "if it would be possible for the United States
to operate against the shores of Korea in accordance with the
Russian forces which would be making an offensive against
23the peninsula. " J No agreement was reached on ground
operations on the Korean peninsula simply because such
amphibious operations had not been contemplated, and
17

particularly not in the near future." But for air and
naval operations both sides agreed on separating Manchuria,
Korea and the Sea of Japan into U.S. and Soviet zones.
Contrary to the widespread misconception that the
division of Korea was another secret agreement made either
at Yalta or Potsdam, the idea concerning the actual division
of Korea was originated from military planners in the U.S.
War Department Operations Division. Due to the Russian
entry into the war against Japan on August 9» 19^5. and
Japan's first offer of surrender on August 10, 10^5» U.S.
planning had to be abruptly switched from an invasion
strategy to that of occupying the enemy territory and
accepting Japan's surrender. Under such circumstances, U.S.
military planners drafted General Order No. 1 including the
provision concerning the 38th parallel line, which was
finally approved by Truman on August 13. 19^5- This order
stated that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel in
Korea would surrender to Soviet troops, while those south
of the 38th parallel would surrender to U.S. troops. J
The text of this order was communicated to the British
and Soviet governments. In his reply on August 16, 19^5f
Stalin requested some changes but made no reference to the
provision having to do with the 38th parallel line. It is
worthy of note that Russian forces entered North Korea on
August 12 while General Order No. 1 was still under discussion.
This time factor clearly proves that the division of Korea
18

along the 38th paralle was made neither at Yalta nor Potsdam.
But one may raise the question why the 38th parallel was
selected as the line of demarcation. From the U.S. strategic
standpoint, the division of Korea along the 40th or 39th
parallel was an ideal situation. Was it because the 39th
parallel would place Dairen in the military zone to be
occupied by U.S. forces? There is not the slightest doubt
that the Russians would have not accepted a surrender line
that barred them from Dairen and other parts of the Liaotung
peninsula. In any case, it was politically and militarily
infeasible for the United States to move a surrender line
north to the 39th parallel because the Yalta agreement states
that:
The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized,
the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this
port being safeguarded and the lg£se of Port Arthur as a
naval base of the USSR restored. 2°
Even without this secret agreement, it would have been
impossible for the U.S. forces to occupy the northern part
of Korea because they were some 600 miles away on Okinawa,
while Soviet forces already had invaded North Korea and
Manchuria. It was totally unnecessary for the U.S. forces to
occupy all of Korea even if it could because the United States
expected that joint control would extend throughout Korea
under a joint trusteeship following the termination of the
occupation. One may conclude, therefore, that the United




Another question that may be raised is why Stalin
did not raise objection to a surrender line along the 38th
parallel. Soviet forces were strategically in a better
position to occupy the whole of Korea. There was then no
way for the United States to block a Soviet southward
invasion in Korea in the absence of a formal agreement. It
is most likely that Stalin's acquiessence regarding the
demarcation line was largely motivated by the desire to
have the United States "authorize the Russian forces to
accept the surrender of the Japanese in the Northern half
of Hokkaido.*' 27
Although the United States officially maintained that
the purpose of the occupation was to enforce the instrument
of surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, it was apparently
desirable, viewed from the U.S. viewpoint, to secure a
military, political foothold in the southern part of Korea
which would be used, if necessary, as countervailing forces
in the future. The desirability for the presence of American
occupation forces may have stemmed from the U.S. fear that a
Soviet dominated local government would be set up, regardless
of the outcome of the projected international trusteeship.
As early as July 19^5 1 in his memorandum to President Truman,
Secretary of War Stimson expressed such fear when he stated,
The Russians, I am also informed, have already trained
one or two divisions of Koreans, and, I assume, intend
to use them in Korea. If an international trusteeship
is not set up in Korea, and perhaps even if it is, these
20

Korean divisions will probably gain control, and influence
the setting up of a Soviet dominated local government,
rather than an independent one. This is the polish question
transplanted to the Far East. My suggestion is that the
trusteeship be pressed. I suggest also that at least a
token force of American soldiers or Marines be stationed
in Korea during the trusteeship. ^o
The U.S. intention to gain a foothold in Korea was
clearly reflected when General Lincoln suggested that "if
the Russians failed to accept the U.S. proposal on the 38th
parallel, and if Russian troops occupied Seoul, American
29
occupation forces should move into Pusan."
Thus, one may come to the conclusion that the
decision by the United States of temporarily dividing
Korea into two zones was based on both military and political
considerations to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces
and to deter the Soviet Union from taking advantage of
political and military vacuum in Korea.
3. The Moscow Agreement on Trusteeship
By the terms of the Cairo Declaration the United
States, Great Britain and China are committed to the complete
independence of Korea in due course. However, it was at
the Moscow Conference in December 19^5 that the vague term
"in due course" came to mean "a four power trusteeship for
30
a period of up to five years. "^ The Koreans described the
Moscow Agreement on Korea as an insult to themselves and as
another form of subjugation from which they had just emerged.
The trusteeship, however short, would mean a postponement
of independence for Korea. To the Korean people one master
21

would be simply replaced by four new masters. Therefore, the
whole nation staged demonstrations against trusteeship and
in favor of immediate independence.
The embarassed U.S. military command sought to
31interpret the meaning of trusteeship as "help and advice. "^
Secretary of State Byrnes in a December 3d 19^5 broadcast
to the American people went so far as to state that the Joint
Soviet-American Commission "may find it possible to dispense
32
with a trusteeship. ,, -/
Then, on January 2, 19^+6, the communist groups in
Korea, doubtless on Russian instruction, suddenly changed
their attitude and came out in favor of trusteeship. Well-
rehearsed demonstrations in favor of trusteeship were held
in North Korea and leftist groups in the south dutifully
fell into line while the nationalists stubbornly maintained
33their opposition. J The communists favored it because in
their view it more than promised ultimate communization of
all Korea. This was the first crack in the frozen ice
into which the whole nation was to submerge with political
turmoil.
The U.S. military government assured anti- trusteeship
leaders such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo that the United
States would exert its utmost efforts for early independence
of Korea, and it asked that they call off strikes which
they used as part of the anti-trusteeship campaigns. The
anti-trusteeship forces somewhat refrained from strikes.
22

However, they continued their agitation against the Soviet
35
Union, denouncing it for delaying independence. ^
The Soviet Union did not remain idle to this situation.
Tass, the Soviet news agency, denounced the U.S. military
government for instigating demonstrations against the
decision of the Moscow Conference of foreign ministers.
On January 26, 19^6, General John R. Hodge, commander of
U.S. armed forces in Korea, described the Tass statement as
37being "preposterous."-^ Adding fuel to the fire was a
statement made by Colonel General Shtikov, chief of the Soviet
Mission to Seoul. He told a press conference the same day
that it had been the United States which had proposed the
trusteeship plan for Korea, that the United States had insisted
on trusteeship of up to 10 years and that the United States
had had no interest in the establishment of a provisional
government of Korea, prior to the setting-up of trusteeship.
In disclosing a proceeding of the Moscow Agreement, the Soviet
Union was apparently motivated by the desire to present itself
as a true protector of Korean interest and to cause the
Koreans to believe that they had been betrayed by the United
States.
General Hodge's embarassment was compounded when
Acting Secretary Acheson confirmed the Russian version.
His confirmation did not conform to what the U.S. military
command in Korea had assured the Korean leaders all along
that the United States would strive for early independence
23

of Korea. In a conciliatory gesture, John Garter Vincent,
director of Far Eastern Affairs, stated that "self-government
and independence are the goals" and that "trusteeship is
39
only a procedure which may or may not be necessary."-' 7 This
was a great deviation from the earlier U.S. position that
trusteeship was considered essential to prevent the Soviet
domination of Korea. But the Soviet Union gave no indi-
cation that it would "be willing to dispense with the
trusteeship plan.
The Moscow agreement provided that a conference of
the U.S. and Soviet commands in Korea shall be held within
two weeks to solve urgent problems affecting both the North
kO
and South. The first meeting was held on January 16, 19^6,
in which the U.S. delegation voiced its desire for prompt
elimination of the 38th parallel and integration of the two
zones. But the Soviet delegation viewed the problem as merely
one of exchange and coordination between two entirely separate
^1
zones of administration. Given this divergence of views, the
conference was able to reach agreement only on such minor
matters as the exchange of mail, allocation of radio
frequency and military liaison.
The joint commission established by the Moscow
Agreement to take steps for the formation of a provisional
democratic government in Korea held its first meeting on
March 20, 1946. ^ The Soviet delegation refused to consult
with Korean political parties and social organizations which
2k

had opposed a trusteeship in proceeding to the formation of
a provisional government. This means that only a communist
minority which had supported a trusteeship would be included
in the consultation. The U.S. delegation argued that the
Korean people should be permitted to express their views on
the trusteeship. Under the terms of the Moscow Agreement,
the question of trusteeship must await an agreement by the
four powers after consultation with the provisional Korean
government. From the U.S. viewpoint, exclusion of Korean
parties and social organizations which had opposed the
trusteeship was a wanton violation of the basic principle
of freedom of expression and democratic procedure. The
second session, which was reconvened from May 21, 19^7 until
late August of that year, remained stalemated due to the
Soviet reversal to its 19^6 position.
In retrospect, and hypothetical as it may be, it is
questionable whether the widespread opposition to the trustee-
ship provisions of the Moscow Agreement was the unique stumbling
block standing in the way of a united Korea. Some argue that
if the trusteeship plan had been implemented, the division
of Korea would have been prevented. However, even without
the widespread opposition to the trusteeship, bilateral
negotiations by the two contending powers might have failed
to reach any satisfactory agreement. From the Soviet view-
point, the establishment of a provisional government loyal
to the Soviet Union would be desirable because of Soviet
25

strategic interest in Korea. Given the drastic change in
U.S. foreign policy, which was characterized by its
"containment" of communism, the conflict of national
interests between the two opposing powers could not have
been avoided. Each was persistent in pursuing its own
predominent position in Korea. Henry Chung in his The
Russians Came to Korea states:
To submit to the Russians terms for governing Korea
means not only selling the southern half of the country
down the Volga (the northern half had already been
sold out by the blunder of an American president) , but
also sounding the retreat of the United States from
the Asiatic mainland. Since military strategy dictates
that whoever control Korea will ultimately control Asia,
the United States cannot afford to have the Japanese
menace replaced by the Russian menace. There is no
alternative for the American government but to carry
out its commitments to the Korean people without Russian
cooperation, limited though it is only to the American
zone of occupation.^
B. THE BIRTH OF THE ROK IN 19^8
1 . U.S. Policy Toward Korea in the United Nations
The obvious failure in the Joint U.S. -Soviet
Commission to make progress toward the establishment of
a Korean provisional government led the United States to
search for a solution to the Korean question at the governmental
level. Acting Secretary of State Lovett proposed in August
19^7 that the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement
meet "to consider how that Agreement may be speedily carried
out." y The core of his proposal was the idea of holding a
general election in the two separate zones to establish
separate legislative assemblies under the guidance of the
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United Nations. His proposal was accepted by China and the
United Kingdom. However, the Soviet Union rejected this pro-
posal on the ground that the possibility of reaching agree-
ment within the framework of the joint commission had not been
exhausted. Faced with this impasse once again, Acting Secre-
tary Lovett informed the Soviet Union on September 17. 19^7
i
of the intention of the United States to place the Korean
question before the UN General Assembly, stating that "bilat-
eral negotiations have not advanced Korean independence" and
"the Soviet government does not agree to discussions among
the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement." On the same
day Secretary of State George C. Marshall in his address before
the UN General Assembly stated that "it is therefore the inten-
tion of the United States Government to present the problem of
Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly." '
Unilateral action by the United States to refer the
Korean question to the UN General Assembly was tantamount to
an admission by the United States of failure in Korea and was
a violation by the United States of an international agree-
ment regarding Korea. But this course of action seemed, under
the circumstances, inevitable and the most promising alterna-
tive. As one analyst put it, "it would place on the United
Nations and its members some of the responsibility which the
United States had hitherto assumed alone. At the same time,
since American security was not considered to be at stake, no
kg
vital interest would be jeopardized."
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Judging from the Soviet negative attitude toward both
the joint commission and a four-party conference adhering to
the Moscow Agreement, there was obviously no prospect for ob-
taining cooperation from the Soviet Union even in the United
Nations. The draft resolution regarding Korea presented by the
United States before the UN General Assembly session in Novem-
ber 19^7 was almost identical in its basic ideas with the
proposal which Acting Secretary of State Lovett in August 19^7
had made to the governments of China, the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union. It was merely different sides of the same coin.
The prime emphasis of the U.S. draft resolution was on
holding a general election by March Jl , 19^8 on a national, not
on a zonal basis, under the supervision of the UN Temporary
Commission on Korea and on the withdrawal of foreign troops
from the two separate zones following the formation of a united,
independent Korea. The Soviet Union introduced a counter-
proposal, calling for U.S
<
and Soviet troops to leave Korea
simultaneously at the beginning of January 19^8 "to give to
the Koreans the opportunity of forming a government by them-
selves" ' without interference of outside forces. The Soviet
resolution was voted down; the U.S. resolution won approval.
The United States, through the decision of the UN
General Assembly, won a victory. However, the Soviet negative
attitude toward the resolution made a general election through-
out Korea impossible. With its failure to gain access to the
Soviet occupation zone of North Korea, the UN Temporary Com-
mission was compelled to take an alternative course of action,
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that is, the holding of a general election only in South
Korea on May 10, 19^8.
That this course of action would have serious
consequences for Korea was quite obvious. The establishment
of a South Korean unilateral government would induce the Soviet
Union to establish a communist regime in the north. The United
Nations had no better choice but to take the risk of creating
two Koreas, instead of preventing the creation of two hostile,
irreconsilable regimes. From the U.S. viewpoint, the birth of
the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August 19^8 was a testimony of
the fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to Korea because of im-
plementation of the UN resolution written by the United States
and supported by the majority of UN member nations.
2. Withdrawal of U.S. Occupation Forces
With regard to the U.S. interest in South Korea, from
the point of view of U.S. military security, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in the later part of 19^7 regarded U.S. forces there
as "a military liability" on the ground that they could not be
maintained there "without substantial reinforcement prior to the
initiation of hostilities" and that "any offensive operation
the United States might wish to conduct in the Asiatic contin-
ent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula."^ Eut
some had doubts whether the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South
Korea should be carried out without considerations of its
political and military consequences. Gen. Albert G. Wedemayer,
in his report on China-Korea to President Truman, warned:
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The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea
would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea
either by Soviet troops, or as seems not likely, by the
Korean units trained under Soviet auspices in North
Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet
satellite communist regime in all of Korea. 51
Francis 3. Stevens, assistant chief of the Division of
European Affairs, raised the question of whether the United
States could get out of Korea without losing its prestige.
The United States had the fear that continued lack of
progress toward the Korean question would create a chaotic
political and economic situation, including violent disorder,
making the position of U.S. occupation forces untenable. "A
precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces under such circum-
stances would lower the military prestige of the United
States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting
cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the
52United States."-^ Furthermore, the United States was
convinced that the Soviet proposal for simultaneous with-
drawal of occupation forces at the beginning of 19^8, if
accepted, "would lead to the early establishment of a
dictatorship in Korea. " JJ Precisely for these reasons, the
United States objected to the Soviet proposal for withdrawal,
made at the Joint U.S. -Soviet Commission in September 19^7.
Leaving Korea to its own fate prior to reaching an
agreement on Korea in the United Nations would be tantamount
to U.S. abandonment of Korea. The decision of withdrawal was
thus delayed through 19^8 when the UN General Assembly adopted
the U.S. draft resolution calling for mutual withdrawal of
occupation forces "as early as practicable."-^
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Given the Soviet politico-military objectives in
Korea, U.S. withdrawal would apparently leave a vacuum
behind "unless the United States, upon withdrawal, left
sufficient indigenous military strength to enable South Korea
to defend itself against any but an overt act of aggression."^-5
With this in mind, the National Security Council in a report
of April 2, 19^8 advocated the withdrawal of occupation forces
by December Jl , 19^8. ° President Truman later approved this.
It is clear, therefore, thEfc the United States had made the
decision for withdrawal long before the Soviet announcement
for withdrawal in September 19^8. U.S. forces began their
withdrawal on September 15i 19^8.
Soon after the initial withdrawal of U.S. forces, the
situation in the new Republic deteriorated due to armed
insurrections and daily surging domestic turmoil. Under these
circumstances, the State Department reviewed the conclusion
set forth in NSC-8 that the United States should withdraw
its forces from South Korea as soon as possible with a
minimum of bad effects. "The complete withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Korea at this time," the State Department argued,
"would seriously jeopardize the security and stability of the
Government of the Republic of Korea. '*" However, the State
Department recognized that the continued retention of U.S.
forces "entails the risk of being forced to choose between




event of war in Korea. The State Department recommended
that the April 2, 19^8 decision made in the NSC-8 be reviewed.
In support of the policy of early withdrawal, the
Department of the Army presented the following viewsr y
1) the U.S. has little strategic interest in
maintaining its troops and bases;
2) the Army made no budgetary provision for the
retention of troops beyond Fiscal Year 19^9;
3) the ability of the ROK forces to cope with
internal disorders minimizes the need for further retention
of U.S. forces; and
k) the mission assigned U.S. forces prohibits
involvement in actions precipitated by any faction or any
other power which could be considered a casus belli for
the United States.
At the same time, the Department of the Army held the
view that the withdrawal of one regimental combat team
remaining in Korea be completed not later than March 31, 19^9.
despite a request from the ROK Government for the retention
of U.S. forces for a few months.
The disagreement on the timing of total withdrawal
between the Department of State and the Army was finally
solved when President Truman approved the March 22, 19^+9
NSC-8/2 report calling for the completion of withdrawal of
the remaining U.S. combat team not later than June 30, 1949.
In its report, the NSC concluded that "this step in no way
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constitute a lessening of U.S. support of the Government of
the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step
toward the regularization by the United States of its
60
relations with that government." As was the case with the
NSC-8 report, the NSC-8/2 report supported the political
independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic
of Korea.
Six months after the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from North Korea in December 19^8, the last of U.S. forces
left Korea only to return one year later. Thus, for the
first time in half-a-century, the Koreans were left alone by
big powers, in spite of the fact that their country was
divided into two hostile forces along the 38"th parallel.
C. THE KOREAN WAR
1. U.S. Intervention
The strategic value of a particular piece of real
estate should be measured by how much impact which its loss
would have on increasing the adversary's capability to
launch another attack on another piece of real estate we value,
and on decreasing our own capability to resist enemy's further
attack. The scenario that South Korea had no strategic
value was used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a justifi-
cation for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in
19^8 and 19^9.
Secretary Acheson's remarks of January 12, 1950, on
the U.S. defense perimeter running along the Aleutians- Japan-
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the Ryukyus-the Philippines—added little to what was known
to be the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His remarks
clearly implied that the Republic of Korea was placed outside
the U.S. defense perimeter. What was new in his remarks
was that "so far as the military security of other areas
in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no
61
person can guarantee these areas against military attack."
Precisely for these remarks, North Korea seems to have been
encouraged to embark upon its military invasion against the
South, convincing itself that there would be no military
involvement by the United States in case of a full-scale
invasion. The North Korea apparently had taken his remarks
at face value. What was miscalculated by the North Korean
leadership was a new U.S. military and diplomatic approach
toward Korea; that is, support for the collective security
system embodied in the UN Charter. In his speech, Secretary
Acheson stated:
Should such an attack occur-one hesitates to say where
such an armed attack could come from-the initial reliance
must be on the people attacked to resist it and then
upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under
the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not
provoked a weak reed to lean on by any people who are




Contrary to the general belief that Acheson was going
to abandon Korea, he clearly stated:
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We have given that nation great help in getting itself
established. We are asking the Congress to continue that
help until it is firmly established, and that legislation
is now pending before the Congress. The idea that we should
scrap all of that, that we should stop half way through the
achievement of the establishment of this country, seems to
me to be the most utter defeatism and utter madness in our
interests in Asia. But there our responsibilities are more
direct and our opportunities more clear. ^3
John Foster Dulles made a more precise statement
before the ROK National Assembly on June 19, 1950. In it,
he said:
Already the United States has twice intervened with armed
might in defense of freedom when it was hard pressed by
unprovoked military aggression. We were not bound by any
treaty to do this. We did so because the American people
are faithful to the cause of human freedom,, and loyal to
those everywhere who honorably support it.
He concluded:
You are not alone; you will never be alone, as long as
you continue to play worthily your part in the great
design of human freedom. °5
This assurance by Dulles seems to have come too late
for the North Koreans to affect their plan for military
action. The southward invasion by North Korea in June 1950
might have been prevented if Acheson had made it clear that
Korea had the deterrent value of defending Japan which he
said the United States would never abandon and that the
United States would give full support to collective security
action by the United Nations, including the use of armed
forces if necessary.
Why did the United States suddenly reverse its policy
toward Korea when North Korea launched its all-out attack
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on the Republic of Korea? Acheson's testimony before a
congressional committee explained it. He stated that the
attack on the Republic of Korea was seen as a "challenge to
the whole system of collective security, not only in the
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Far East, but everywhere in the world." If the attack
were appeased with U.S. arms folded while a free country
was swallowed up, it seemed obvious to U.S. policy makers
that the Soviet Union would be encouraged to launch further
attacks on other areas adjacent to itself. The primary
political value of U.S. intervention was that any other
free countries could count on the United States and
collective security action by the United Nations in case
of attack, with or without firm U.S. commitments.
In retrospect, if the United States had dropped Korea
in the face of aggression, the worldwide political, economic
and military impact would have been enormous. Japan, which
the United States values most in Asia in political, economic
and strategic terms, could have been forced to swing into
the Soviet camp for fear of aggression which, alone, it
could not resist. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization would not have been given a powerful impetus
to its military build-up and its political solidarity.
Among other things, the United States could have lost its
worldwide credibility, weakening the confidence of those
who count on the United States. But, as a result of U.S.
intervention, the confrontation between China on the one
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hand and the United States on the other served well the Soviet




The UN collective action in Korea was undertaken to
achieve the military objective of repelling the aggression
and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement.
It was not the U.S. position to establish a unified, inde-
pendent, democratic Korea by force of arms. The signing of
the July 1953 Armistice Agreement thus constituted the ful-
filment of the military objective of UN collective action in
Korea. The military demarcation line corresponding to the
battle line at the end of the hostilities was established.
Although this line does not coincide with the 38th parallel,
both North Korean and Chinese communist forces were driven
back to a line farther north than south of the 38th parallel.
For the North Korean regime one can say that it was
totally denied the "liberation of the fatherland" by force
of arms. For the Chinese communists one can argue that if
Chinese military intervention was motivated by the buffer
zone concept to maintain a friendly communist state in the
area adjacent to China, one should admit that it achieved
its military objective. If China had a limited military
objective based on the buffer zone concept, why did
the Chinese forces cross the 38th parallel and launch a general
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offensive in 1951? Viewed from this context, one can also
argue that China certainly sought to drive UN forces from
the whole of Korea, outrunning its original limited military
objective,. The Armistice Agreement thus denied China the
fruits of aggression.
Syngman Rhee was strongly opposed to an armistice
which left Korea divided, denouncing the prospective cease-
fire as a "death sentence" to the Republic of Korea. Rhee
reluctantly agreed to a cease-fire only after the United
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States promised him the following:
1. Promise of a mutual security pact.
2. Assurance of long-term economic aid, with an
initial installment of $200 million.
3. Agreement to implement the planned expansion of
the ROK Army to 20 divisions with modest increases in the navy
and air force.
4-1 Withdrawal from the political conference after
90 days.
The war was over with the signing of the Armistice
Agreement on July 27, 1953 1 but Korea remained divided,
this time along demarcation line.
Today's divided Korea is still technically at war.
The first important factor is that the Armistice Agreement is
not a peace treaty which legally terminates hostilities. The
agreement merely insured a cessation of hostilities between
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the "belligerents until such time as a peaceful settlement
is achieved. The parties signatory to the agreement merely
have tacit commitments to the implementation of the pro-
visions of the agreement. The second is that most of the
provisions of the agreement, other than ending the host-
ilities and exchanging the prisoners of war, have not been
fully implemented.
Within 2h hours of the signature of the Armistice
Agreement, the communist side began to introduce aircraft
into North Korea. A report of the UN Command specified on
August 9, 1957 that "the communists have illegally intro-
duced large numbers of combat aircraft, mostly jet fighters,
and now maintain an air force of more than 700 planes based
68
in North Korea." North Korean air force strength thus
increased from zero in 1953 "to more than 700 in 1957- The
report added that the communists have also illegally intro-
duced artillery pieces in the category of 122mm. mortars and
75/76 gun/-howitzers . y All of this was a wanton violation
of sub-paragraph 13 (D) in Article 11 of the Armistice
Agreement, which provides in part:
Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat
aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition;
provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn
out, or used up during the period of the armistice may
be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same
effectiveness and the same type. 70
Accordingly, on 21 June 1957, the UN Command announced
its plan to reinforce UN forces in Korea. The UN Command
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had no better alternative but to renounce the sub-paragraph
13 (D) to restore the relative balance of military strength
which the armistice was intended to preserve. Neither side
had any means to prevent the other side from violating the
agreement. In view of this fact, the Armistice Agreement
as such became non-existent. What remained was a nominal,
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III. SECURITY RELATIONS, 1953-I976
A. U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT
1. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
The most direct result of the Armistice Agreement
was the security treaty with the Republic of Korea, which
reversed the 1950 U.S. policy of leaving the ROK defense
responsibility to South Koreans themselves first and to a
UN collective action later. There is no doubt that the
conclusion of the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty sig-
nifies the recognition by the United States of Korea's
strategic and deterrent value in defending U.S. interests
in the Far East and in the Western Pacific.
Article III is the key point of the treaty. Under
that article "each party recognizes that an armed attack
in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories
now under their respective administrative control of the
other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
1 ^
accordance with its constitutional processes."
Under Article III, there are no obligations whatsoever
for either party to come to the aid of the other without
going through its constitutional processes. The consti-
tutional process is time consuming. In a sudden attack, it
would be impractical to seek to determine the nature,
^5

timing and exact extent of collective action to be taken.
In such a case, this element of time would prove decisive.
By sharp contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty approach makes
an armed attack on one tantamount to an attack on all. One
may wonder if an armed attack on the Republic of Korea would
be regarded by the U.S. Congress as an attack on the United
States itself. Viewed from the South Korean standpoint, this
is an essential vulnerability of the treaty. However, under
Article III of the treaty, the United States does not permit
itself to be automatically involved in any future conflict
in Korea. This gives the United States an advantage of taking
any action which it deems appropriate and necessary.
The scope of U.S. commitments under the treaty is
limited. In the case of an armed attack from North Korea,
the obligation of the United States would be limited only to
the area which the United States recognized that the ROK
government had lawfully brought under its administrative
control. The limitation that the United States imposes
itself on the scope of its commitments is apparently designed
to deter the Republic of Korea from launching an armed
attack on North Korea. The treaty is undoubtedly defensive
in nature. Precisely for this reason, the treaty has a
negative objective of forestalling a repetition of the
Korean War "by a clear warning to potential aggressors that
the United States and the Republic of Korea will regard an
kS

armed attack on the territory of either party as dangerous
2
to their peace and security."
The treaty, which "grew out of the Korean Armistice
negotiations and the legitimate concern on the part of the
Republic of Korea for its security in the period following
the armistice"^ constitutes a symbol of collective security
and solidarity in the Pacific area, an essential factor
which may play a major role in preventing a recurrence of a
second Korean War.
2. The Deployment of U.S. Forces
The main pillar of ROK national security rests upon
a double foundation. For the past three decades the United
States has stationed its troops in the Republic of Korea.
The first function of U.S. troops there is to observe the
1953 Armistice Agreement. The second is to deter an armed
attack from North Korea. Being a signatory to both Armistice
Agreement and the- 1953 -U.S . -ROK Mutual Security Treaty, the
United States has the right to station its troops there. In
Article IV of the treaty," the Republic of Korea grants, and
the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose
United States land, air and sea forces in and about the
terrritory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual
agreement." However, the United States would be under no
obligation to station its forces in the Republic of Korea
under the treaty. This seemingly places the security of
^7

the Republic of Korea in an unfavorable position. In actuality
the security of the Republic of Korea was already reinforced
when the 16 UN members with troops in Korea, including the
United States, declared on July 27, 1953 !
that if there is a renewal of the armed attack. . .we should
again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of
such a breach of the armistice would be so great that, in
all probability, it would not be possible to confine
hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.
5
When the Mutual Security Treaty was concluded, the
international security system was characterized by a bipolar
cold war relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Unions Both North and South Korea were, respectively, a
component of these two opposing forces. Under such circum-
stances, it was inevitable for the United States to shift
its security policy toward Korea. The pre-Korean War U.S.
defense perimeter was subsequently replaced by a new one
linking Korea and Taiwan—the areas adjacent to the communist
countries. Since then, the Republic of Korea has emerged
as a vital U.S. forward defense area in East Asia and in the
Western Pacific region.
The new international situation required a new
worldwide defense policy. As early as December 1953
»
President Eisenhower announced a progressive reduction of
U.S. ground troops in Korea. He went on to point out that
U.S. military forces in the Far East will feature "highly
mobile navel, air, and amphibious units"; and he added that in
this way, despite some withdrawal of ground troops, the United
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States will have a capacity to oppose aggression "with even
greater effect than heretofore. . .
"
Testifying before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate on 14 January 195^» General Ridgeway stated that
"the contemplated withdrawal of two Army divisions would not




These two statements clearly imply that the United
States would not engage itself in an Asiatic land war, nor
would it employ the same policies and resources to fight
another war as used in the Korea conflict. The redeployment
of these two divisions was an integral part of the Eisenhower
Administration's "New Look" defense policy which was to place
less emphasis on ground forces to deter future aggression.
The Eisenhower Administration perceived a high level
of domestic disenchantment with the limited war in Korea and
assumed that reduced defense spending and a balanced federal
budget were essential to a strong economy*.. The result was a
defense strategy known as massive retaliation. This strategy
was "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate,
ginstantly, by means and at places of our choosing." to deter
communist aggression. This strategy was used as a rationale
by the Eisenhower Administration to carry out a progressive
reduction of ground troops in Korea.
Both the ^Oth and ^5th divisions left Korea in June
195^ • Again the State Department announced on August 195^
^9

that four of the six remaining divisions would be withdrawn,
saying that the impending withdrawal would not have any
setback in the defense of the Republic of Korea because of
the withdrawal of some 200,000 Chinese troops from North
Korea. The R0K Government was strongly opposed to the
impending troop withdrawal, pointing out that North Korea
had introduced "more than 400 fighter planes since the
10
signing of the Armistice Agreement." The National Assembly
convened a night session and adopted a resolution denouncing
the withdrawal. Nationwide demonstrations were held, demand-
ing that the U.S. troops remain in the country.
Despite the nationwide anti-troop withdrawal campaign,
the three army divisions--the 25th, the 3d and 2^th--and one
11
marine division left Korea in 195^ and 1955 respectively.
The United States in return agreed to provide the R0K Govern-
ment with a $700 million military and economic assistance
program for FY 195^-1955« Washington reaffirmed its pledge
to use military force, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, to defend the Republic of Korea against any out-
12
side aggression.
As noted earlier, even before the ink was dry, the
North Korean side began to introduce fighter planes and heavy
weapons in violation of the provisions of sub-paragraph 13(D)
of the Armistice Agreement which were specifically designed
"to insure the freezing of the military status quo by main-




1953«" ^n view of these facts, the United Nations Command
side to the Military Armistice Commission on 21 July 1957
informed the Communist side of its intention to renounce
the provisions of sub-paragraph 13 (D) of the Armistice
Agreement. The United Nations Command side said:
The stability of the Armistice and the maintenance of the
relative military balance, which it was the primary purpose
of these provisions of the Armistice Agreement to insure,
can now only be restored and maintained by the replacement
by the United Nations Command of its old weapons with new
items currently available. The United Nations Command is
taking appropriate steps to this end.-^
Earlier indications of U.S. intentions to take steps
which would restore the military balance in Korea were
given by Secretary of State Dulles at his news conferences
of April 2, and May 1^, 1957. On May 1^, he stated:
The Armistice Agreement has to be interpreted, I think, in
a realistic way. It was made nearly 5 years ago, presumably
for a brief duration, and called for a replacement of
weapons only on a piece-by-piece basis of comparable
quality. Well now, in the passage of that 5 years much
of the stuff that was there is no longer made, has become
obsolete. Therefore, it is not practical to replace it
exactly on a like-for-like basis, and there must be some
elasticity there. Furthermore, we have good evidence that
the Chinese Communists from their side are introducing
weapons, planes into the area upon a basis which does not
involve by any means a strict or reasonable compliance
with the Armistice Agreement. Under those circumstances
we are considering introduction of more modern, more .,
effective weapons outselves into the Republic of Korea. -*
Thus, the United States regarded the old prohibition
of the armistice agreement as no longer inhibiting the United
States in modernizing UN Forces in Korea because of prior
violations on the communist side. As early as 28 June 1957
»
F-100 fighter planes and B-57 fighter bombers were introduced
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into Korea. Ground troops were provided with new- type
rifles and bazookas, and H-21 helicopters. Most significant
was the fact that the 7th Infantry Division was reorganized
as a "petomic" unit which was armed with 280 mm atomic guns
and surface-to-surface missiles. The 1st Armored Division
16
was redeployed from Japan to Korea, on 1 August 1957'
All of this was a clear indication that the Korean peninsula
has been turned into an arsenal and that the United States
would use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an attack
from North Korea.
Meanwhile, U.S. military assistance to the Republic
of Korea in the FY 1958 alone totaled $331.1 million. This
represented more than 60% of the total amount of military
assistance the Republic of Korea had received in the
immediately preceding five years.
Under these circumstances the North Korean reaction
was most dramatic. In its statement on February 5i 1958
»
North Korea made a proposal calling for the simultaneous
withdrawal of "U.S. army and all other foreign troops in-
cluding the Chinese People's Volunteers" from North and South
Korea and a reduction of both North and South Korean armed
17forces to the minimum in the near future. On February 7,
1958 the Chinese issued a statement in support of the North
18
Korean proposal. Without waiting for U.S. response,
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Korean Premier Kim
Il-song issued a joint statement in Pyongyang on February
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19 t 1958 » confirming that the Chinese People's Volunteers
19
will be completely withdrawn before the end of 1958. In
October 1958 the withdrawal of all Chinese People's Volunteers
from Korea was allegedly completed.
Why didn't China trade off the withdrawal of the
Chinese People's Volunteers from Korea for one by the UN
Command side? It may be assumed that both North Korea and
China might have been simply unwilling to take the risk of
another armed conflict under the new military situation
in Korea where U.S. forces were armed with new- type weapons
with tactical nuclear capability. It is also conceivable
that China might have no longer had access to modern Soviet
weapons because of a restraint on the part of the Soviet
Union. If these assumptions are correct, the presence of
U.S. forces with nuclear capability, as stressed by former
secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger, not only operates
as a restraint on North Korean adventurism, but also functions
as a restraint on other powers in the area.
The United States has not forgotten what happened
within several months after the United States withdrew its
troops from Korea in 1949. The United States had no intention
of making the same mistake again, especially when North
Korean forces were heavily armed in violation of the armistice
agreement. Even without the presence of Chinese forces
in North Korea, North Korea always has the advantage of a
communist mainland beyond the Yalu River, across which
53

supplies and reinforcements can be sent to support a new
aggression. The implication is that to withdraw UN forces
from the Republic of Korea would leave Korea once again
exposed to the threat of renewed communist aggression.
With these considerations in mind, the UN Command justified
its continued presence in Korea in the following words:
United Nations forces are in Korea at the instance of
the United Nations. In accordance with the existing
recommendations of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, the Government concerned are prepared to
withdraw their forces from Korea when the conditions
for a lasting settlement laid down by the General
Assembly have been fulfilled. 20
In sum, the U.S. military commitment to Korea
under the Eisenhower Administration placed its emphasis on
reducing the presence of U.S. forces, building up ROK forces
through military assistance programs and relying on the
strategy of massive retaliation to deter communist aggression.
B. ROK PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR
Commenting on the motives for Korea's dispatch of combat
forces to South Vietnam, Chyun Sang-jin, former ROK vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote:
The Republic of Korea's voluntary dispatch of its armed
forces to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people uphold
their independence and soverignty was prompted by bitter
experience during the Korean War and lessons it learned
from international cooperation. The resolute action was
also based on its own apprehension of situation and on
the call of conscience. This is not at all an offensive
involvement for war but a defensive involvement for peace.
The action was firmly based on the belief that peace can
in no circumstances be achieved through appeasement only,




It is understandable that the initial decision to
send non-combat troops was undoubtedly motivated by the
strong desire to compensate for the debt Korea owed to the
United States and other friendly countries. A deep sense of
moral obligation was deeply ingrained in Korean conscience
because of the aid given by the United States to Korea during
the Korean conflict. This is evidenced by the fact that in
September 196^ when the National Assembly unanimously
voted for a dispatch of a group of self-defense instructors
and a medical team.
There was growing criticism among opposition political
forces in the National Assembly on the decision of over-
extending military commitment. The controversy over
military commitment reached its peak in early 1966 when the
ROK Cabinet decided to send additional combat troops. The
oppsotion forces argued that "the pulling out of ^9,000 elite
troops would jeopardize the security of the country" and that
"such a move might induce a similar counter-action by North
Korea on behalf of Hanoi, thus increasing the chance of
22
renewed North-South conflict in Korea."
In making this decision which would affect the security
of the country, the ROK Government was most probably motivated
by the following factors:
First, the ROK Government was motivated to forestall the
redeployment to Vietnam of the remaining U.S. combat troops.
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A second factor was to further strengthen a ROK security
position by obtaining a guarantee for the U.S. automatic and
immediate response in case of aggression.
A third inducement was to modernize ROK armed forces
through U.S. military and economic assistance programs.
The first case was substantiated by the fact that "the
ROK capital defense line had been moved from the Han River
northward to the Imjin River just south of the DMZ. This
move was significant because it implied that both the U.S.
and South Korean forces were committed to the defense of
capital city of Seoul rather than retreating southward to more
23
advantageous terrain. " v
The second was evidenced by the fact that South Korean
leaders always fear that the "constitutional process" clause
under Article 3 of "the mutual security treaty will slow U.S.
reaction in a crisis. For this reason, when Cyrus Vance was
sent by President Johnson to Seoul in February 1968 to soothe
Korean fears in the wake of the Pueblo crisis, the Korean
leaders demanded "immediate and automatic U.S. military
intervention" in case of aggression and the holding of
annual meetings at the ministerial level of defense ministers
to discuss and consult on defense and security matters of
0I4,
mutual interest and common concern. President Johnson
and Park held a summit meeting in Honolulu in April i960, and
Johnson "reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the
United States to render prompt and effective assistance
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to repel armed attack against the Republic of
Korea." 25
The third was proven by the fact that on March 7, 1966,
Withrop G. Brown, U.S. ambassador to Korea, presented to
the ROK Government a 14-point memorandum. With this
memorandum, the U.S. Government officially confirmed its
agreement to give additional military and economic aid
as a reward for Seoul's plan to send more troops to South
26
Vietnam. It was at the first ROK-U.S. defense ministers'
meeting in Washington in May I968 that the United States
agreed to provide aid for developing a ROK munitions industry
and arming the 2.5 million Homeland Reserve Defense
Forces.
A major negative effect of South Korea's involvement in
Vietnam was the escalation of tensions along the DMZ. The
armed provocations of North Korea on land and sea in and near
the DMZ and the infiltration into the Republic of Korea of
armed agents were further intensified with each passing day
in parallel with an increase of ROK troops in Vietnam. It
is fairly safe to assume that North Korea deliberately brought
the situation in Korea to a brink of war by raising the
possibility of a second front to thwart the U.S. -ROK war-
efforts in Vietnam.
A report made by the UN Command in Korea to the United
Nations on November 2, 1967 indicated a drastic increase of
violations by North Korea of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.
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A total of 5^3 incidents, in contrast to 50 incidents in
I966, has taken place in 1967, resulting from the infiltration
28
into the Republic of Korea from North Korea of armed agents.
Casualties and incidents caused by infiltration are shown by
the following table:
TABLE I

















ROK National Police &
Other Civilians Killed:




























Source: U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy;
Current Documents, 1967 (Washington GPO, 1969), p. 789
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North Korea's policy of deliberate, reckless
brinkmanship was further demonstrated by the assassination
attempt by a 31 -man North Korean commando teamen the life of
President Park on January 21, 1968, the seizure by North
Korea of the U.S.S. Pueblo on January 23, 1968 and the
shooting down of U.S. reconnaisance aircraft EC-121 on
April 15, I969. All of these incidents clearly shows that
North Korea appeared to be ready to risk even an all-out
military confrontation with the south.
The Seoul Government maintained that the seizure of
the U.S.S. Pueblo by North Korea was designed "to upset and
obstruct the political stability and economic progress in
the Republic of Korea and to apply braking pressure on
29Korea in her assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.
"
For these reasons, the Seoul government insisted on taking
firm and resolute actions against the north. In light of
America's mild reaction to the Pueblo crisis, the ROK leaders
started seeking new approaches toward national security
based on "self-reliance." The series of new security
arrangements made between the United States and the Republic
of Korea in the wake of' the Pueblo crisis eloquently spoke
itself.
From I969 there has been an increase in major weapon
supplies to the Republic of Korea. This reflects two factors.
First, increased military assistance has been provided to
the Republic of Korea as a quid pro quo for ROK combat
troops in Vietnam. Secondly, after the Pueblo incident,
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U.S. arms supplies and military assistance were increased.
In addition to regular military aid and $32 million for anti-
infiltration equipment scheduled for I968-I969, a $100
million request was added to the President's annual foreign
aid message. It was to be spent on anti-aircraft equipment,
patrol boats, radar, ammunition and aircraft. The Republic
of Korea received a squadron, valued at $52 million, in the
summer of 1969. Thus, the removal of ROK combat troops
from the Korean front line was offset by increased U.S. arms
supplies after some five years of declining U.S. military
aid. (see Table 2 below)
TABLE 2
U.S. Military Assistance to the







Source: SIPRI, The Arms Trade within the Third World , SIPRI,
1971.
Despite a vulnerable Korean situation created in the
wake of North Korea's armed provocations, ROK's military
commitment in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam changed
the ROK's image from a U.S. client-state to its more reliable
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ally. It has thus laid a solid foundation on which to build
more secure security ties "between the United States and the
Republic of Korea.
C. THE DOCTRINES OF NIXON AND FORD
1 . The Nixon Doctrine
The ROK leaders seemed to have the notion that the
enunciation in I969 of the Nixon Doctrine had no applicability
to the vulnerable Korean situation. This notion probably
rested on the contention that there would be no change in
a level of U.S. troops in Korea as long as ROK troops re-
mained in Vietnam. Contrary to their contention, then
Secretary of Defense Laird made the following remarks
before a House subcommittee in 1969:
There is no bargain, there is no understanding along
that line. I want the record to show that there is no
commitment as far as the United States is concerned
along that line, and we shouldn't let anyone think that
there is any kind of commitment like that because, as far
as I am concerned, I would not go along with any commit-
ment like that. 31
The announcment on July 5. 1970 of the reduction of
U.S. troops by one army division came as a "Nixon shock" to
the South Korean people in general and to their leaders in
particular. "If GI * s go, I go," remarks made by the
Prime Minister Chong-Il-kwon, represents Korea's protest
over the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea.
It is apparent that the ROK leaders regarded what
came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine in its worst possible
light—America's total retreat from Asia,~^ despite repeated
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assurances that the United States would keep all its treaty
commitments through military and economic assistance in
case of aggression.
The ROK's uneasiness over its security was surfaced
during 1969, initially by indications that the U.S. military
presence on the Ryukyu Islands might be affected by the
conversion of the islands to Japan in the early 1970 ' s. The
ROK Government had regarded Okinawa as a "bulwark to the
security of the Republic of Korea and Free Asia." It was
against this backdrop, in March and June 19^9. that an
alarmed ROK Government suggested to the United States the
use of Cheju Island as a substitute for Okinawa or as a new
3*5
naval and air base complex. -* The U.S. refusal mystified
the ROK leaders.
It was against this background that ROK's uneasiness
over its security was aggravated by the U.S. decision to
remove one army division from Korea. Its uneasiness stemed
from one primary concern; that is, the obvious removal of
deterrence. However, Senator Joseph Tydings expressed the
opposite views.
Senator Tydings challenged those who contend that
U.S. deterrent would not be credible without the presence
of two U.S. army divisions in Korea. He argued that
employing one army division along the DMZ as a "trip-
wire" vitiates the critical "constitutional processes"
clause in the U.S. -ROK security treaty because an attack
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on the U.S. front line division would automatically insure
U.S. involvement in the conflict. If such is the case
with respect to the ROK security, it may be safe to
conclude that it is no longer Washington, but Pyongyang,
which will determine the form of U.S. action in response
to a threat to the ROK security. For the United States,
then, the "constitutional processes" clause will become
totally meaningless.
In addition to this argument, the principal reasons
which in his opinion constituted a compelling case for the
withdrawal of one U.S. army division from Korea are:
First, the Republic of Korea possesses the military
manpower and resources to cope with any invasion from North
37
Korea, providing U.S. air support is continued. In his
Guam speech, President Nixon indicated that "we shall look
to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense. "^
The Nixon Doctrine is keyed to the utilization of local
manpower whenever possible. The use of local forces can be
maintained at less cost to the United States; for example,
Korea can maintain twenty troops for the cost of one U.S.
soldier. ' Given the excellent fighting ability of ROK
troops, coupled with a population of Jl million in the south
and its economic resources, it was apparent to Senator Tydings
that the "Koreanization" policy would permit the replacement by
Korean troops of a departing U.S. division from Korea at less
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cost, just as "Vietnamization" was expected to permit the
total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.
Second, the United States is party to the 1953 Mutual
Defense Treaty. Article II of that treaty commits the United
States to take appropriate action in case of communist
aggression. Finally, the 16 nations, including the United
States, which furnished military forces to the UN Command
during the Korean War issued a statement in July 1953
pledging themselves to renew the war if communist aggression
recurred. Senator Tydings believed the U.S.-ROK security
treaty and the pledge made by other allies to be another
factor serving to reinforce the credibility of the U.S.
commitment as a deterrent.
It is highly doubtful, however, that the United States
would commit its combat troops once again should a similar
situation develop. The reason is that the Nixon Doxtrine
is designed to extricate the United States from the morass
of the future Asian conflict in favor of greater self-reliance
and independence among the Asian allies of the United States.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that other allies would
commit their troops once again should the United States re-
frain from its military involvement. For these reasons,
it was apparent to the ROK leaders that the pledge made by
the United States and other allies was regarded as unreliable.
Premier Chong Il-kwon summarized the problem from Seoul's
6^

point of view this way: "No matter what the United Sta
takes out, North Korea will take the beginning of a with
drawal as a wavering or weakening of United States inte.
here.
With the planned reduction of one-third of the
approximately 64,000-man force level authorized for Korea,
the United States had a credibility problem, not only with
Seoul but also with Pyongyang. U.S. failure to "punish"
North Korea for the capture of the spy ship Pueblo and the
shooting down of an unarmed EC-121 reconnaissance plane
did little to strengthen Pyongyang's view of the credibility
of the United States to use its military might in a crisis.
Is there any "magic number" below which North Korea
would assume it was safe to risk a second Korean war? There
is no magic number. However, South Koreans always remember
that the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 19^9 was followed by
an invasion in 1950 from the North. Whatever the rationale
behind the U.S. move to reduce forces, the ROK leaders
believe that no U.S. assurance to Seoul is greater than the
presence of combat troops as a tangible evidence of the
U.S. defense commitment.
After the decision to reduce U.S. troops in Korea
from 63,000 to ^-3, 000, the United States shifted a wing of 5^
phantom F-4 fighter bombers from Japan to station them
permanently in South Korea, and proposed special budget
request of $1.5 billion over a five-year period for Korean
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force modernization. This move is a clear reflection of the
altered concept of a U.S. defense posture in Korea embodied
in the Nixon Doctrine. The scenarios of this concept are:
(a) with the reinforcement of U.S. air force and expanded
military assistance programs, ROK forces can provide its own
ground troops to counter North Korean invasion which does
not involve any outside forces; and (b) in a future Asian
conflict, if it does involve China, there is a possibility
that the United States may intervene with the use of
tactical nuclear weapons. With regard to U.S. intervention
in a future Asian conflict, President Nixon stated in his
foreign policy statement:
--the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater
nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale
Soviet attack on NATO or Chinese attack on our Asian
allies
:
--the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on
our allies by Russia and China are low both because
of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of
Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe
that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily
by U.S. conventional forces. ^2
A major effect of this new U.S. defense posture was
seen in a 5-year modernization program for the ROK armed
forces. An important part of the program was the transfer
of excess material to the ROK Government. By June 1972, the
United States transferred approximately $95 million of
equipment from withdrawing U.S. troops and excess defense
articles. Examples of major items transferred include TOE
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equipment of eight former U.S. batallions, M48A2C tanks and
army aircraft, and wheeled vehicles with the associated
repair parts and secondary items. -'
But the progress of the modernization program depends
on Congressional appropriations. The Congressional cut in
the military grant assistance portion of the foreign aid pro-
gram impacted heavily on the modernization program. In the
fiscal year 1972 alone, the U.S. Congress appropriated approx-
imately $150 million for the ROK, nearly ^0 percent less than
had been requested. In addition, U.S. military grant-in-
aid for the ROK came to a virtual end in the latter half
of 1975* Thus, the action by Congress was a great setback
to this program.
Another effect of the U.S. new defense posture was
that in March 1971 1 the 2nd Infantry Division pulled back
from the DMZ and turned over its area of responsibility
to an ROK Army Division. ROK troops now guard all but a
500-meter sector of the DMZ around Fanmunjom, site of the
Military Armistice Commission meetings between the UN Command
and North Korea, and the highway from Munsan-ni to the
Liberty Bridge.
For the first time since the termination of the Korean
War in 1953 1 "the Koreans have assumed the responsibility
for the defense of the entire 155-mile DMZ from sea to sea.
This conforms to the concept of the Nixon Doctrine that U.S.
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allies can and should assume the responsibility for their
own defense. On 9 February 1971, President Park Chung Hee
stated: "To assume this primary responsibility for the
defense of our own land, this is the basic spirit and posture,
in my view, for self-reliant national defense." His
statement was a clear indication that the Korea's initial
concern over the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Korea has been replaced by a growing pride that now the
Koreans defend their own country with the reduced level of
U.S. troop strength.
Despite sweeping cutbacks and redeployment of U.S.
troops, Korea's faith and confidence in the United States
and in itself has been sustained, if not enhanced. First
of all, while the ROK Army has taken over the responsibility
for defense of the DMZ , the United States has continued to
bear a substantial responsibility in countering the North
Korean threat in the air. A significant improvement in
the air defense was achieved in March 1971 when th 3-d
Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Kunsan Air Base.
Secondly, the U.S. commitment was not abandoned. President
Nixon himself said of the U.S. -ROK security treaty: "Our
treaty is very clear that in an attack on either one of us
in the Pacific area, we will act to meet the common danger
in accordance with our constitutional processes. .. I think
our actions show better than words that we do intend to
abide by the commitments that we made to Korea in that
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treaty." One action that the United States demonstrated
was "Exercise Freedom Vault," staged in March 1971. The
Exercise was intended to show the U.S. capability and in-
tention to meet aggression whenever it occurs in support of
its treaty obligations.
Despite repeated U.S. assurances for the security of
Korea, ROK leaders seemed to have perceived the Nixon
Doctrine to be an "unmistakable signal" for the total with-
drawal of U.S. troops from Korea in the foreseeable future.
Their perception of the Nixon Doctrine was reinforced by the
U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam and the subsequent
collapse of Vietnam in 1975' Therefore, it may be safe to
assume that what had happened in Vietnam in 1975 probably
prompted ROK leaders to initiate their ambitious and expen-
sive ($5 billion) five-year Forces Improvement Program which
would be financed primarily by a new income surcharge tax.
In addition, the program called for completing a $1.5
billion U.S. military aid plan, drawn up in 1970, that was
running well behind schedule. For this reason, President
Park asserted that "at least until the modernization is
fully accomplished, it is absolutely necessary for the
United States forces in Korea to be kept at their present
level." 51
His statement appears to open the way for the
reduction and eventual withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops
from Korea. But any reduction of the remaining U.S. troops
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depends on how soon the Forces Improvement Program would be
completed. Conversely, progress of the program depends on
ROK's economic growth and U.S. military grant aid programs.
It seems that the U.S. move from much larger grant aid
programs to smaller ones, to credit programs, to cash sales
would make it more difficult for Korea to fulfill the
modernization program as scheduled. As a result, the U.S.
ground combat troops would he compelled to remain hostage
at least until the modernization program is completed,
because a phased withdrawal of the U.S. troops is contingent
on prior consultation by the U.S.-ROK Security Consultation
Committee.
One disadvantage of the Nixon Doctrine is that if the
United States continues to assert its national interests in
Korea while both adopting a budget-constraint strategy and
arbitrarily shifting the level of U.S. troop strength, the
United States will be faced with a situation where the U.S.
role in the absence of an active U.S. presence may not
satisfy the U.S. national interests. Under this circumstance,
the United States will merely react to things as they happen.
As a consequence, the United States will find itself in an
unfavorable situation where the United States will lose its
initiative and choice before it even has a chance to consider
better alternatives to cope with that situation. But one
advantage of the Nixon Doctrine is that if the doctrine is
thoroughly implemented, the United States will have its
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security commitment to Korea on U.S. terms, rather than
at the nercy of Korea.
2. The New Pacific Doctrine
The Nixton Doctrine called for American military
dis involvement in Asia, a lowered profile and a sharing of
b urdens
.
The Asian strategy of the 1950's and 1960*s, which was
characterized by containment of communism in Asia by force
of arms, collapsed when Saigon fell in 1975* With the fall
of Saigon, the Ford Administration learned a painful lesson
at a great cost that "equilibrium in the Pacific is essential
to the United States and to the other countries of the
Pacific."^ This prompted the Ford Administration to
formulate its new, forward-looking policy toward Asia, which
President Ford described as a "Pacific Doctrine of peace
with all and hostility toward none."-^
The principal difference between the Nixon Doctrine
and the Ford Pacific Doctrine was in President Ford's pledge
of continued "America.' s active concern for Asia and our
presence in the Asian Pacific region."-^
Far from retreating in disgrace after defeat in
Indochina, President Ford affirmed a U.S. obligation "To take
a leading part in lessening tensions, preventing hostilities
and preserving peace. "^-^ This affirmation reflects a firm




The six premises of U.S. policy toward Asia pi
forward by President Ford in Honolulu on December 7.
are '.
1. No isolation for America. "American strength is
basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific."
2. Partnership with Japan is a "pillar" of U.S.
strategy.
3. Normalized relations with the People's Republic
of China.
k. A continuing stake in Southeast Asia.
5. Settlement of outstanding political conflicts in
Korea and Indochina.
6. A structure of economic cooperation with Asia.
The primary goal of the Ford Pacific Doctrine was to
prevent the outbreak of a second Vietnam war in a region where
the United States has fought three costly wars since 19^1.
President Ford believed that this could be achieved by
buttressing U.S. allies in Asia on one hand, while cooperating
with China on the other.
This flexibility in the U.S. approach to Korea and
China was clearly seen when American troops were pulling out
of Taiwan to help speed normalization of U.S. relations with
China and, at the same time, the United States remained
committed to security on the Korean peninsula, as the presence
of U.S. forces attested.
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Meanwhile, the United States also was willing to
establish links with North Korea. This was demonstrated
by Kissinger's proposal on (2) the simultaneous admission
into the United Nations of both North and South Korea and
(b) cross recognition by major powers of the two Koreas.
The United States rejected North Korean overtures for a
Washington-Pyongyang peace agreement without the partici-
pation of the Republic of Korea. This is what President
meant when he said: "The United States is ready to consider
constructive ways of easing tension on the Korean penin-
sula f but not at the expense of the sovereignty and
integrity of the Republic of Korea.
All of these moves on the part of the Ford Administration
was apparently motivated by the desire to attain one single
objective; that is, regional stability.
Despite the change of U.S. security interests in
East Asia from "containment" to "regional stability," and
despite the U.S. flexible approach to communist countries in
East Asia, what remained intact was a continued presence of
U.S. ground troops and air force.
In his FY 1975 Annual Defense Department Report to
the Congress, Former Secretary James R. Schlesinger gave
the following reasons for a presence of U.S. forces in
Korea:
In Northeast Asia, South Korea's defense capabilities
have been considerably improved in the last five years--
to such an extent that, when the present modernization
program is completed, we may have reasonable confidence
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in South Korea's ability to defend itself against an
unaided attack by North Korea. At the moment, the
principal role of our forces in Korea is to provide a
hedge against the uncertainties and deficiencies in
South Korea's defense posture, and to provide an
inducement to caution on the part of North Korea
against the precipitation of new hostilities. 58
In his interview with the New York Times on August
18, 1975, President Park stressed the need for the presence
of U.S. forces in Korea this way: "I am of the opinion that
the United States should look at the presence of U.S. forces
in Korea from the viewpoint of global strategy. It is
necessary to maintain a balance of power in this very delicate
<o
part of the world.' This means that Korea is a crucial
area in East Asia where the interests of major powers are
closely interlocked. For this reason, the presence of about
40,000 U.S. forces not only serves as a deterrent against
North Korean misbehavior, but also functions as a checkmate
against manipulation by China or the Soviet Union on the
Korean peninsula. In addition, the U.S. presence in Korea
serves as a "pendulum" maintaining a delicate power of
balance in East Asia where no nation--be it China, the Soviet
Union or the United States--can emerge predominant.
President Park's assessment of the role of U.S. forces
coincides with that of the Ford Administration. But many
members of the U.S. Congress questioned the continued
presence of U.S. forces there, contending that they risk
involving the United States in another politically unpopular
7^

war in Asia. This notwithstanding, the Ford Administratior
assured the ROK government that the U.S. government would
render "prompt and effective" assistance to the Republic
of Korea in the event of aggression from the north. With
regard to implications for this U.S. policy toward Korea,
Ralph N. Clough in his East Asia and U.S. Security
stated:
In pursuit of its long term interests in East Asia, the
United States should work to prevent armed conflict
between the two Koreas, to strengthen the interest of
all four big powers in peace in Korea, and to avoid
actions toward Korea that would undermine Japanese
^ Q
confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to Japan.
The United States has intrinsic interests of the
highest priority in Japan. Therefore, the presence of
U.S. forces in Korea is easily justifiable in terms of U.S.
credibility to both Japan and Korea. As long as the United
States regards the partnership with Japan as a "pillar" of
U.S. strategy in East Asia under the Pacific Doctrine, U.S.
commitment to the republic of Korea seems to be logical and
.essential. However, U.S. commitment to South Korea does not
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Given the hostilities on both sides of the DMZ and
conflicting interests of the major powers, their possibility
of renewed conflict cannot be ruled out. President Carter
was entirely aware of this situation when he assumed office
in 1977. However, in 1977, President Carter, cited ROK
economic growth and many recent fundamental changes in the
international scene, announced the decision to continue the
policy of withdrawal of U.S. combat troops which was begun
in 1970. At the same time, he provided that the ROK forces
should be modernized.
The unilateral and unprecedented decision to withdraw
U.S. combat troops from one of the world's most sensitive
areas will have a significant impact—politically, econom-
ically, militarily and psychologically—on the Korean
peninsula. This chapter will focus on the above issues
beginning with the President's withdrawal plan.
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL DECISION
There is one thing in common between the proponents and
critics of Carter's troop withdrawal decision: American
troops should not remain in Korea forever. However, the
logic of Carter's troop withdrawal decision was questioned
by some critics. The issue emerged in May 1977 when Maj.
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Gen. John K. Singlaub at the United Nations Command in
Korea was removed from his job "because of his comments
that the U.S. Second Infantry Division in Korea served as
a powerful deterrent that, once removed, could lead to war.
Obviously, the presence of U.S. combat troops serves
as the symbol of American power and determination and as a
deterrent to another land war in Asia. Conversely, backed
by nuclear arms and deployed along the historic invasion
corridor between the DMZ and Seoul, some 25 miles to the
south, U.S. combat troops there constitutes a "tripwire"
which almost guarantees automatic U.S. involvement in the
event of war.
It is precisely for this potential "tripwire" that
President Carter decided to pullout troops from Korea. A
congressional critic pointed out that if this "tripwire"
argument is valid, the United States "ought to withdraw
troops from all over the world and return to the concept
1
of 'Fortress of America'."
Basically, President Carter had justified his withdrawal
decision on three premises: First, he cited as a precedent
the withdrawal of 20,000 American troops from Korea by
President Nixon in 1970-1971. Secondly, he considered the
strategic relationship between major powers in Northeast
Asia stable enough to facilitate the pullout. Third, he
felt that with its strong economies, the Republic of Korea
2
would grow into a position of defending itself.
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A critic of the Carter decision pointed out: First,
there are profound military, political and psychological
differences between a reduction of troops and the total
withdrawal of combat troops, and secondly, in the earlier
troop reduction, the United States failed to induce
reciprocal action by North Korea. To the contrary, North
Korea responded by promptly initiating a massive five-year
3built-up of its forces.
As seen by Washington, the political climate in Asia
has changed. Testifying before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on May 1, 1978, Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown elaborated this way:
Growing Soviet and Chinese military capabilities in East
Asia are largely directed toward each other, absorbed in
mutual hostility. Neither has been able to transform
military power into significant political advantage in
East Asia. The U.S. relationship with China has also
been transformed, with both sides recognizing the value
of stable ties with each other. Neither the Soviet
Union nor China has any incentive to encourage or u
underwrite military adventures in the Korean peninsula.
Triangular relationships in Asia also involve Peking,
Moscow and Pyongyang. It is precisely for the Sino-Soviet
dispute that North Korea finds itself in a situation it can
play a role of pivotal power. North Korea has acquired
something close to a capability to move out on its own
militarily. For this reason, China on one hand and the
Soviet Union on the other need to include North Korea in a
coalition to make it a winning one. The result is that
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North Korea is able to influence the policies of the two
communist neighbors more than one might think possible
on the basis of its small size. It is fairly safe to say,
therefore, that the Sino-Soviet dispute could compel both
China and the Soviet Union to honor their treaty commit-
ments to North Korea in one way or the other in the event
of war.
Under this circumstance, despite President Carter's
firm commitment to the Republic of Korea, the unilateral
removal of combat troops could induce North Korea to
miscalculate what the United States would do if it attacked.
That is why General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff , had recommended "a phased partial withdrawal"
of 7.000 army troops over the next five years rather than
the full withdrawal of ground combat troops. General
/
Brown's recommendation was a clear indication that the
removal of American combat troops would heighten the
possibility of a new ltind war in Asia either by an irrational
act or serious miscalculation on the part of North Korea.
However, the Joint Chiem endorsed the President's plan
because under it the ROK forces were to receive "tanks,
tactical aircraft, anti-tank weapons and artillery" in
order to offset the pullout of American troops.
Finally, despite its recent economic momentum, the
Republic of Korea still is a developing nation. Why should
it be more capable of defending itself than Japan, an
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economic superpower in Asia? By deciding to remove combat
troops from Korea, the Carter Administration obviously was
insinuating to Asian allies that U.S. national interest in
Asia was secondary to that in Western Europe or that the
United States did not want a repeat of 1950.
B. THE WITHDRAWAL AND MODERNIZATION PLAN
In March 1977. President Carter announced his intention
to withdraw all 28,000 U.S. ground troops from Korea in
k to 5 years. The withdrawal was to consist of three stages.
The first stage was to end in 1978 when 6,000 troops, in-
cluding a combat brigade of three battalions of the 2nd
Division, would be withdrawn. The second stage was to
involve primarily support troops. The third stage was to
involve all of the remaining ground combat troops , including
two brigades of- the 2nd Division, which were scheduled to
be withdrawn by 1981 or 1982. The timing of this stage
was important because it was to take place after the 1980
Presidential election. As such, it allowed either a
reelected or a newly elected President to reassess the most
n
important of the three withdrawal stages. This phasing
permitted the United States to reevaluate the situation
throughout the withdrawal effort.
To compensate for the withdrawal of the 2nd Division
o
from Korea, the following actions were to be taken:
8^

1) Increase the U.S. Air Force presence by adding in
1978 12 F-4's to the 60 already in Korea and continue to
maintain indefinitely logistics, communications, and
intelligence personnel.
2) Provide Korea $275 million in FMS credits in FY
1979 and a like amount for each of the next several years.
Most of the FY 1979 credits will be used to continue
programs already underway to improve firepower and mobility
in the following categories:
a) More than $35 million for improved
anti-tank capability by purchasing more TOW missiles and
kits to upgrade M-^8 tanks 5
b) About $52 million to improve air defense by
increasing the number of HAWK missiles and acquiring
additional AD command and equipment;
c) About $125 million to procure F-^ and F-5 aircraft,
improved air munitions, and radar homing and warning systems;
d) Some $30 million to improve mobility by
acquisition of C-I30 transport aircraft and helicopters; and
e) Some $20 million to acquire HARPOON missiles to
counter North Korean ships and to interdict fast infiltration
craft.
3) Provide Korea with $800 million worth of equipment
on a cost-free basis. Identified equipment slated for
transfer included:




b) Honest John rockets and howitzers;
c) Trucked and wheeled vehicles and helicopters;
d) Engineer combat construction equipment, trucks,
and tactical raft sets;
e) Radars and target acquisition equipment; and
f) Communications and air traffic control equipment.
4-) To ensure the effective use of the transferred
equipment, technical and operations training were to be
provided. The estimated cost of training was $2.5 million.
5) $90 million in additional ammunition stockpiling
9
authority.
6) A one-shot credit of $300 million.
The form of the withdrawal and its relationship with
the modernization program are closely related with each
other. A joint communique issued on July 26, 1977 at the
conclusion of the 10th annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative
Meeting in Seoul made clear that compensatory measures to
modernize and strengthen the ROK forces would be implemented
11
"in advance of or in parallel" with the troop withdrawals.
Therefore, Congressional support is necessary for the
withdrawal and modernization plan to succeed, and this
reality is reflected in the President's announcement on
April 23, 1978 of readjustment of the withdrawal schedule.
Under the new withdrawal plan, instead of taking out
6,000 troops by the end of 1978, including one of the
three battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division, the United
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States planned to: First, continue with the withdrawal of
about 2,000 support troops; second, withdraw one infantry
"battalion to achieve a total withdrawal of about 3.^00 by
the end of 1978; and third, keep the remaining combat
battalions of the brigade and other support elements, which
12
also up to 2,600 personnel, in Korea until 1979. This
change did not alter the overall withdrawal schedule. It
changed only the timing of the first stage of the withdrawals
The immediate U.S. consideration in implementing the
withdrawal program was to avoid any reduction in the com-
bined U.S.-R0K combat capability and take action to replace
the combat capability represented by the 2nd Division. For
these reasons, Gen. David C. Jones, acting chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged the support by Congress of
the security assistance package, contending that the success
of this first phase of the withdrawal and of the subsequent
phases over the next four or five years would be dependent
on timely and orderly transfer of equipment and weapons
necessary to maintain the prevailing military balance on
13the Korean peninsula. J
To boost R0K military capabilities prior to the
completion of the troop withdrawal over the next few years,
it is also necessary for the United States to provide Korea
with continued military assistance in the form of FMS
credits. A five-year Force Modernization Plan for the
R0K armed forces, which started in 1971 and financed by
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$1.5 billion in U.S. military assistance, was "two years
behind schedule" when President Carter announced his troop
withdrawal plan. The final U.S. contribution came only
in 1977- (see Table 3)
TABLE 3
Force Modernization Plan
(In millions of dollars; fiscal years)
Terms 1971-75 1976-77 Total
Grant 918 80 988






Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic
of Korea. A Report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John
Glenn , January 9, 1978, p. 44.
Since 1976, the Republic of Korea has initiated its
own 5-year Force Improvement Plan (FIP) , with an estimated
cost of §5.5 billion and foreign exchange costs of $3-5
billion. The United States FMS credit contribution to the
FIP would be $1.4 billion in fiscal years 1977-81. The FIP
is being financed by substantial increases in the ROK defense
budget, made possible by the continuing high rate of growth
of the ROK economy. The table below summarize defense
























Sources: The International Institute for Strategic Studies
(LLSS). Military Balance . London: IISS 1976-1978.
A Handbook of Korea , Seoul: Korean Oversees
Information Service, 1978, p. 459.
Ha-ptong Annual 1980 . Seoul: The Haptong News
Agency, 1980, p. 103. 170.
Unlike the previous force modernization plan 1971-1975.
the U.S. contribution to the current ROK modernization
efforts is small proportionately. Therefore, the ROK has to
finance the bulk of the modernization program. Thus, the
ROK faces the problem of balancing its economic development
needs and its military expenditures in a way that will not
adversely affect its economic growth. Much of ROK ' s economic
development depends on foreign investment. Foreign invest-
ment in turn depends on credible security in the face of the
North Korean threat. As the United States withdraws its
ground combat troops from Korea, the United States must
insure credible security and investor confidence. This can
be done by providing credits for U.S. military sales needed
to finance ROK's purchase of equipment and weapons.
There was the possibility that the Koreagate scandal
would be linked to further military aid funds requested for
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Korea. But the Koreagate issue was overridden by the U.S.
basic security concern over the security situation on the
Korean peninsula and its importance to the peace and stability
of the region. The U.S. basic security concern over the
situation in Korea found its expression when both the Senate
and the House of Representatives approved $275 million FMS
credits and $800 million for arms transfer for FY 1979 to
support the ROK's five-year FIP. In approving the bill,
the House gave the U.S. president a responsibility to trans-
mit a report to the Congress on the viability of troop
withdrawal 120 days prior to each phase of the withdrawal
Ik
through FY 1983. The report should include:
1) Assessment of the military balance on the peninsula;
2) The impact of withdrawal on the military balance;
3) The adequacy of U.S. military assistance;
^) The impact of withdrawal on the UN-ROK command
structure;
5) ROK's defensive fortification and defense industry
development; and
6) U.S. reinforcement capability and the progress of
diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions in Korea.
The prudent approach by both the Carter Administration
and Congress to the withdrawal and modernization plan may
accomplish three important things. First, it reduces the
chances that the deterrence now provided by U.S. combat
90

troops will be weakened considerably. Second, it will
improve ROK military capabilities vis-a-vis North Korea's.
And third, it will provide incentives for a resumption of
North-South dialogue to defuse tensions on the Korean
peninsula. If tensions rise the President can slow down
or even reverse the timetable.
C. THE MILITARY BALANCE
There are some variations in the assessments of relative
military balance between North and South Korea. Their
military capabilities cannot be measured merely by counting
numerical one-to-one parity in weapons and equipment. Given
the unique geopolitical and military situation in Korea,
several aspects of the balance should be taken into account;
such as, terrain, population, military manpower, GNP, defense
expenditures, firepower, the type of weapons, and U.S. ground,
naval and air power.
1 . Population and Military Manpower
In population South Korea outnumbers North Korea two
to one. When measured by manpower alone in active forces,
the balance is definitely in favor of South Korea. North
Korea solved this disadvantage by extending military service;
seven years for the army, five years for the navy, and three
years for the air force. Senators Humphrey and Glenn's
report to the Senate in January 1978 indicated that North
Korea has almost nullifed South Korea's active duty manpower
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advantage since the North Korean draft age has been lowered
to age 16. The table below shows a disparity in military
manpower.
TABLE 5
Military Manpower Balance Comparison





Air Force ^5,000 30,000
Marines n/a 20,000
Total 500,000 635,000
Para-military: 4-0,000 security 2,200,000





Source: Military Balance 1977-1978, The International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), pp. 60-6l.
A Handbook of Korea , Korean Overseas Information
Service, Seoul, 1978, p. ^58.
R0K ground forces--the fifth largest army in the
world—outnumber those of North Korea by 635,000 to 500,000
and have more combat experience than the North Koreans.
According to Defense Monitor, at least 300,000 South Koreans
are experienced combat veterans of the Vietnam war. •*
2. Defense Expenditures
North Korea has spent as much as 14 percent of its
GNP on defense from 1973 through 1977- The total military
spending of North Korea during the same period was estimated
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at $4.29 billion. South Korea has spent as much as 5
percent of its GNP on defense during the same period. The
year of 1976 marked the turning point in which South Korea's
defense outlay exceeded North Korea's in aggregate. This
sharp rise in defense outlay since 1976 was attributable to
the establishment of defense tax to finance the ROK FIP.
The table below shows a disparity in defense outlays:
TABLE 6
Com-parative Defense Expenditures 1973-1977
$ US billion
North Korea South Korea
GNP Defense Exp. b/a GNP Defense Exp . b/a
Year (a) (b) (*) (a) (b) (*)
1973 4.45 0.62 1.4 12.4 0.47 0.39
1974 4.82 0.76 1.58 17.2 O.56 O.32
1975 5.4 0.88 I.63 18.4 0.72 0.38
1976 8.9 1.0 1.12 25.0 1.50 0.6
1977 9.8 1.03 1.05 31.5 1.72 0.59
Sources: The Military Balance
. 1973-1977. IISS. A
Handbook of Korea
, Seoul: The Korean Overseas
Information Serice, 1978, p. 459.
3. Military Capabilities
The North Korean army includes tank and motorized
infantry divisions along with the mainstay of infantry units.
North Korea enjoys roughly a 2-1 advantage over the South
in tanks and artillery. The North Korea army is structured
and positioned to be capable of delivering a massive fire-
power on South Korea. Its forces are deployed along the
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DMZ so that a surprise attack could be mounted with little
1 6
warning. This is evident from the fact that North Korea
is in a position of choosing the time and place to launch
such a surprise attack.
The ROK army, more than 500,000 strong, still has
serious vulnerabilities. The ROK army lacks the quantity
and quality of first line tanks and sufficient anti-tank
guns needed to assure that an armored advance across
the DMZ will be halted north of Seoul. 17 The ROK army is
also handicapped in ground operations because Seoul, the
capital city, is only ^0 km away from the DMZ, well within
range of heavy artillery and FROG surface-to-surface missiles.
As one expert put it: "The short distance precludes defense
in depth and the nature of the terrain and the road patterns
impede the rapid lateral movement of reserves from east
18
or west into the battle zone."
Thus, the geographical proximity of Seoul to the DMZ,
North Korea's long-range missiles and its numerical
superiority in tanks and artillery pieces suggest that the
North Koreans have the great advantage over the South Koreans
in the ability to make an offensive breakthrough.
Senators Humphrey and Glenn's report cites several
factors as being vital for the defense of Seoul and the
heavily fortified FEEA-ALPHA line two to five miles south
of the DMZ. These include adequate warning time; superior
9^

firepower, mobility; good ROK Army leadership; tactical
air support; and secure lines of communication to the rear.
These factors, however, cannot be taken for granted, es-
19pecially without U.S. ground forces: '
1) Warning time is critical and may be inadequate;
2) North Korea has superior firepower marshalled
near the DMZ;
3) South Korean forces alone lack adequate mobility;
k) Poor visibility or a first strike could temporarily
limit critical U.S. -ROK tactical air support;
and
5) North Korean naval superiority at the outset would
allow amphibious landings of guerrilla forces to
disrupt ROK communications.
However, the South Koreans have an important advantage
in manpower and also have those advantages that come from
20the defender. They are:
1) The strategic hills and ridges north of Seoul favor
the defending forces. Retention of this terrain by ROK
forces would restrict or slow down a North Korean attack;
2) Extensive fortifications in the traditional invasion
routes should enable ROK forces to incur a high cost on an
invading force; and
3) ROK forces enjoy the benefits of impressive
training, high morale and extensive combat experience.
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Finally, there are two worrisome aspects which could
change the dimension of any comparison of North Korean and
South Korean capabilities and vulnerabilities. First, there
is the great possibility that North Korean guerrila forces,
who are already infiltrated into South Korean rear areas, may
attack vital defense installations. In that situation, South
Korea would be compelled to "divert its forces from
their primary mission of repelling an attack on the DMZ
21
to counter special warfare activities of the North." And
secondly, two North Korean tunnels have already been dis-
covered, one of them big enough to rush an assault force
beneath and beyond the South Korean fortifications near the
DMZ. It was believed that at least eight more were under
22
construction. Senators Humphrey and Glenn's report
indicates that these tunnels could be traversed by "3,000
23
to 5»000 troops per hour." •* These two factors can be seen
as North Korea's offensive posture and its special warfare
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SP Guns/How. : 2,000
Mortars: 3,000
TOW, LAW ATGW.
1 SSM Bn. w/Honest John,
2 SAM Bdes. w/HAWK &
Nike Hercules.
HAWK: 80
Nike Hercules SAM: ^4-0
Source: The Military Balance 1977-1978 . International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), pp. 60-61.
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The ROK Air Force is quantitatively inferior by a 2-1
margin to North Korea, (see Table 8 below). An attack would
be launched primarily from bases North of Pyongyang, but
some aircraft could be launched directly from bases near the
DMZ. Although North Korean flights are carefully monitored,
the flight time from North Korean air bases near the DMZ
to Seoul and ROK air bases is so short that a surprise air
attack can be achieved "if an attack is launched from what
2k
appears to be a routine exercise." Thus, the North Korean
air attack makes the ROK air force vulnerable.
TABLE 8
































Sources: The Military Balance 1977-1978. (IISS), pp. 60-61.
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North Korea exceeds the ROK in total number of vessels,
but is inferior in tonnage (see table 9 below). The North
deploys 10 submarines, but has no surface ships of the
destroyer-class or larger. Backbone of the North Korean navy
is a large fleet of speedboats, including 19 guided missile
boats. The ROK navy has no submarines, and relies on destroy-
ers and destroyer escorts/chasers.
TABLE 9
Comparative Navy Strengths, 1977









Large Patrol Craft k
Landing Craft 90
Motor Torpedo Boats 150
Frigates 7
Coastal Minesweepers -





Total Tonnage 17 ,000
Sources: The Military Balance, 1977-1978,







Russell bpurr, "i^orea: The rune Day War," FEER,
(February 27, 1976), p. 29.
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The most formidable threat to the South is the North
Korean submarines and its fast patrol boats. The North
Korean submarines would sink or damage ROK merchant ships
for trade or resupply of war material. The North Korean
fast patrol boats would be useful for landing its commando
forces in the South Korean rear areas, with their infil-
tration capabilities.
Considering the overall military potential of North
and South Korea and taking the ^2,000 U.S. troops present
in the South into consideration, military power on the
Korean peninsula was seen as roughly in balance. As one
analyst put it:
With the present military balance, however, a blitzkrieg
against Seoul might look more promising to the North
Koreans if they were no longer deterred by the presence
of U.S. forces. 5
D. ROK'S REACTION TO THE CARTER ANNOUNCEMENT
Since the South Koreans have always perceived an
military threat from the North to be real, their reaction
to the Carter announcement on American withdrawal was
negative. They worried that after 1982, with no U.S.
combat troop astride the invasion routes to Seoul, U.S.
intervention in any type of conflict might not be prompt
and automatic, President Carter's promises of continued
American support notwithstanding. Obviously, the price that
the ROK Government demanded of U.S. withdrawal was "auto-
matic U.S. involvement" in the event of war, which Philip
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C. Hat>ib, under secretary of state for East Asian Affairs,
described as 'next to impossible" since it would involve
U.S. constitutional processes.
President Carter's announcement was incomprehensive
even for President Park because he shared the view that
U.S. troops in Korea, together with the NATO forces in
Europe, are two pillars with which the United States can
27
contain the Soviet Union. " Although President Park
said that he had no intention to ask U.S. forces to stay
longer, his great concern over the prospects of American
withdrawal was clearly expressed when he demanded that
"nuclear weapons" in South Korea be turned over to South
Korea. Habib and General Brown refused to even discuss
28
nuclear weapons.
Stunned by Carter's move, many South Koreans were
unhappy about Major General Singlaub's removal, and his
blunt prediction of another war left them seriously worried
because it had come from an authoritative mouth. "He spoke
for all of us," said former president Yun Po-sun. Yun and
other opposition leaders likewise have asked for the
29
withdrawal to be postponed. y They also had fear that with
no U.S. presence restraining the ROK Government, their
remaining freedom would be threatened. It was not fortuitous
that the National Assembly on July 7, 1977 adopted a
resolution opposing "one-sided withdrawal."^
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Assurances by President Carter that U.S. determination
to provide prompt support to the Republic of Korea in the
event of war would remain firm, had done little to alleviate
public gloom. Perhaps the mood was illuminated by a
front-page cartoon in a South Korean daily that showed a
bewildered Korean holding President Carter's letter
promising American support while U.S. soldiers were seen
31
sailing away. "Only this letter" the Korean was inquiring.
After the July 26, 1977 Security Consultative Meeting,
the U.S. side agreed to augment ROK forces "in advance of
or in parallel with the withdrawals." Obviously, the
phrase "in advance of or in parallel with the withdrawals"
reflects two differing positions. The former represents
the ROK's view that U.S. ground troops should stay in Korea
until the FIP program has been completed. The later repre-
sents the U.S view that withdrawal would be delayed unless
compensatory measures were approved by Congress. Since
either of these two approaches definitely satisfied the
ROK Government's position, ROK's concern began to subside.
However, there remained the question whether the
deterrent now provided by U.S. combat troops could be
maintained by ROK forces alone after American withdrawal.




Even if the United States provides all the military aid
Seoul has requested to upgrade its own forces, the
planned withdrawal of U.S. ground troops here will leave
South Korea without the deterrent capability now provided
by American support. 32
His comment reflects the sense of uncertainty about the
reliability of the U.S. commitment, With Carter's uni-
lateral move, ROK leaders must have foreseen the eventual
possibility of a future without U.S. support. This was
reflected in South Korea's attempt to purchase more
sophsticated weapons and to diversify arms suppliers. A
request by South Korea for 60 F-16 aircraft with 1.2 billion
and its purchases of some ship-to-ship missiles and anti-
submarine helicopters from France were obviously motivated by
the strong desire to redress the military imbalance with the
North and avoid its total dependence on the United States,
its sole arms supplier.
Successful completion of the FIP would still leave South
Korea with a firepower imbalance. J This added to the
withdrawal of U.S. ground troops with nuclear weapons would
eventually drive South Korea into a blind alley in which
South Korea might not rule out the possibility of developing
its own nuclear weapons. When Habib and General Brown told
ROK officials in June 1977 that all missile units would be
pulled out with the ground troops, Foreign Minister Pak
Tong-chin let it be known that despite the conclusion of the
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Republic of Korea "would make an




stake.' More significantly, a leader of the opposition
party told the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that his party would not oppose the demand of the
ruling party that South Korea "build its own nuclear
35weapons. -'-'
Seoul signed the nuclear Honproliferation Treaty on
April 23, 1975, a few days before the final fall of
Saigon. In particular, the rise of tensions on the Korean
peninsula in the spring of 1975 gave the political decision-
makers in Seoul second thoughts about the acquisition of
nuclear capabilities. In June 1975 1 President Park declared
that South Korea would and could develop its own nuclear
37
weapons if the U.S. nuclear weapons were removed.
It seems that for the decision-makers in Seoul the
question of acquiring nuclear capabilities was considered
to be rather an urgent matter because of the geographical
proximity of South Korea to the sources of threats and
because of the changing U.S. military posture in Asia. With
the credibility of the U.S. security umbrella eroding, they
may have convinced themselves that South Korea may face
the fate of a second Vietnam without a deterrent of its own.
Fears of a South Korean decision to go for nuclear
weapons tentatively subsided somewhat when the Ford
Administration was determined to fulfill the U.S. commitments
to Seoul, despite the setback of the former in Indochina.
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However, the U.S. decision to remove nuclear weapons from
Korea as part of the Carter Administration's nuclear non-
proliferation efforts revived a dormant South Korean
nuclear paranoia.
Would Seoul feel that the threat of going nuclear
strengthens its bargaining position with the United States
and North Korea? An American analyst believes that any
remaining U.S. commitment might be more worthless to Seoul
than before, but it would still serve to hold open the
possibility, if no longer certainty, of U.S. intervention
even against the North Koreans alone. He argues that a
South Korean decision to seek nuclear weapons in defiance
of the United States and at the cost of any U.S. commitment
would invite a possible pre-emptive strike by an alarmed
North Korea.
The emergence of a nuclear South Korea might push its
unification goal beyond reach and tilt a military balance
between the North and the South. Nuclear weapons
are not anyone's monopoly. It is not too hard to predict
what serious consequences would arise from such a situation.
When taking into consideration all these disincentives, it
may be safe to suggest that the supply of conventional arms
,
protected by the American "nuclear umbrella," would be the
most effective way to prevent a painful and costly course of
nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.
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E. CARTER'S NEW POLICY, 1979-1980
There was an assumption that the normalization of
relations between the United States and China and the con-
current movement between China and Japan would have a
favorable impact on international situations in Asia as a
whole. However, the Carter Administration since early
1979 took a cautious, gradual U-turn in its policy toward
Asia in general and Korea in particular. What accounted
for this shift in priorities by President Carter?
1 • Carter's U-Turn policy
To begin with, President Carter's decision to bring
U.S. combat troops from South Korea was one of the examples
showing that his foreign policy was too dedicated to
idealistic goals in favor of promoting moral principles
over military solutions. As a result, under the Carter
Administration, U.S.-ROK security relations were chilly
over such issues as Koreagate scandal, human rights and
troop withdrawals.
President Carter's passive approach in the world of
Realpolitik, however, unraveled in the face of Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China's invasion
of Vietnam in February 1979
•
It seems safe to assume that both the United States
and Japan must have maintained that their expanded relations
with China would provide a bulwark against the threat of the
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Soviet Union in the Far East. It was also assumed that this
trilateral relationship would induce North Korea to defuse
tension somewhat on the Korean peninsula. However, their
rising expectations were shattered by Vietnam's invasion
of Cambodia at the time when the normalization of Sino-U.S.
relations was in the offing. When border clashes between
China and Vietnam escalated into a state of open war, there
was fear that the Soviet Union would maneuver to bring
North Korea into its orbit to form a second front.
The Carter Administration, concerned over an
escalation of war in Asia, saw the potentiality of a Sino-
Soviet war. If such a war broke out, North Korea probably
would be tempted to launch its own southward invasion. The
possibility of another war in Korea was believed to be
greater than at any time in the past. As early as January
1979 > President Carter admitted in his report on Korea to
Congress that "the North Koreans are substantially stronger
30
than had been estimated earlier. "-"
Shocked by the outbreak of hostilities between
Communist countries in Asia and the potentiality of a Sino-
Soviet conflict, the Carter Administration began to have
second thoughts about Asia and to set two primary goals in
its foreign policy: l) to prevent any non-communist nation
from being drawn into the intra-Communist wars, and 2)
to project U.S. political and economic interests in Asia.
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Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke told the
Koreans that the new U.S. policy meant the United States
will "maintain an ability to react in the region and will
remain deeply involved."
As a result of these developments, the first step
taken by the Carter Administration was an announcement in
February 1979 that "withdrawals of U.S. ground combat forces
from Korea would be held in abeyance pending the completion
of a reassessment of North Korea's military strength."
The second step was President Carter's state visit
to Seoul from June 29 to July 1, 1979 where he reaffirmed
the commitment of U.S. military power in Asia. ^
The final step was President Carter's decision to
freeze further withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. In his
statement on July 20, 1979 » President Carter stated:
1) Withdrawals of combat elements of the 2d Division
will remain in abeyance. The structure and function of the
Combined Forces Command will continue as established in
1978;
2) Some reductions of personnel in U.S. support units
will continue until the end of 1980; and
3) The timing and pace of withdrawals beyond these
will be reviewed in I98I.
These decisions followed an intelligence reassessment
which had confirmed a significant increase in North Korea's
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ground forces, armour, firepower and mobility since the
U.S. ground combat troop withdrawal began in 1977-
All of these decisions was a reflection of the
changing political and military posture of the United States
in East Asia, a sign that the United States will remain
an actively involved Pacific power. In the security arena,
this new posture was underlined when the United States
assured the Republic of Korea that:
1) The United States will continue to provide its
nuclear umbrella to the Republic of Korea;
2) The United States will continue to make available
for sale to Korea appropriate weapons systems and defense
industry know-how;
3) The United States will coassemble F-5E and F-5F
fighters in Korea and will transfer 36 F-16 fighter bombers
to Korea by 1986; and
k) The United States will deploy A-10 close air
support aircraft in Korea.
These measures of U.S. support for ROK's security did
not necessarily parallel U.S. efforts to solve differences
over human rights and political liberalization. Wide
differences over human rights continued to be what one analyst
described as "weak thread in an otherwise solid fabric of
hi
relations." between the two countries. Therefore, the
purpose of President Carter's visit to Seoul was three-fold.
The primary reason for his visit was to alleviate the deep
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South Korean and Japanese concern over obviously diminishing
U.S. commitments to Seoul. He accomplished this by freezing
the withdrawal and pledging further U.S. military aid to
LlQ
Seoul. The second reason for his visit was to attempt
to reduce tensions in the peninsula by calling for three-
way talks with North and South Korea. The third reason was
to put some pressure on Seoul for human rights reform.
The one thing which did not please the Park
government during Carter's visit was the U.S. President's
tough public stand on the limitation of human rights in
South Korea. In his nationally-televised address in Seoul,
President Carter stated:
There is a growing consensus among the international
community about the fundamental value of human rights,
individual dignity, political freedom, freedom of the
press and the rule of law... There is abundant evidence
in Korea of the dramatic economic progress a capable and
energetic people can achieve by working together. I
believe this achievement can be matched by similar
progress through the realization of basic human aspir-
ations in political and human rights. ^9
The displeasure of the Park government over Carter's
lecture was expressed by one Korean official this way:
Sometimes it seems that U.S. asks much more of its
friends than of countries that do not even try to
measure up to American ideals on things like human
rights. 50
Nevertheless, Seoul responded to President Carter's
pressure by releasing some dissidents later in the month.
But the Park government did not lift decree No. 9, which
outlawed criticism of the 1972 Yushin (revitalizing)
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constitution, one concession which had been urged on Park
by Carter during his brief visit to Seoul. The Achilles'
heel of the Park regime was the Yushin constitutional
system which centralized an unlimited power in the
presidency while limiting the power of the National
Assembly.
The outbreak of mass ant i-government demonstrations
in Pusan and Masan in October 1979 compounded political
turmoil, which began with the expulsion of opposition leader
Kim Young Sam from the National Assembly and the resignation
of all opposition members from the National Assembly. As with
the downfall of the Shah of Iran, there was fear that South
Korea's vicious cycle of repression, protest and further
repression would jeopardize the U.S. security role in the
region. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Carter
Administration recalled Ambassador William Gleysteen from
Seoul after Kim's expulsion.
Secretary Harold Brown's arrival in Seoul for an
annual security meeting coincided with serious rioting in
Pusan. In a press conference in Seoul on October 19, 1979,
he stated:
I do not believe that any attempt by the U.S. to manage
the U.S. security role here to achieve some particular
political objectives would benefit either our long-term
strategic interest or contribute constructively to
political development in Korea. 52
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The message was simple and clean The U.S. security
interest in Korea transcened its concern over human rights
53issue . Regional U.S. security requirements dictated
South Korea's political stability. Brown tried to keep the
security issue separate from the human rights issue with
an understanding, if not approval, of each other's
on human rights.
Opposition leader Kim Young Sam asserted that the
two issues were closely related, contending that "the most
effective weapon against North Korean aggression and the
strongest possible guarantee for national security would
be the government's promotion of democracy."^ A few days
before Secretary Brown's arrival in Seoul, Kim Young Sam





on the Park government to ease political repression.
Obviously, Kim's statement put the United States in a dilemma
because any decisive move by the United States in favor of
one side against the other would be regarded as U.S. inter-
ference in South Korea's domestic affairs.
Precisely because of U.S. reluctance to use its security
commitments to force the ROK Government to ease its political
repression, and because of President Carter's reversal of
the troop withdrawal policy, U.S. -ROK security ties were,
as Secretary Brown put it, in "excellent shape. "^ Their
closer security ties were evident from a joint communique
issued in Seoul at the close of the 12th annual U.S. -ROK
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security talks in October 1979 • In it, the United States
affirmed, among other things, that "the security of the
Republic of Korea is indispendable to that of the United
States."-57
Thus, the security of the Republic of Korea emerged
once again indispensable to preserving peace and stability
in East Asia. This was reinforced immediately after the
assassination of President Park on October 26, 1979 by
Washington's hands-off warning to Pyongyang: The United
States will "react strongly. .. to any external attempt to
exploit" the political turmoil in South Korea.
With the central figure removed from the political
scene, South Korea faced a struggle for power. A subsequent
coup on December 12 by Maj. Gen. Chon Doo Hwan and his
colleagues cast doubt on the future of civilian government.
Whatever its motives, the coup obviously was a step away
from any semblance of Western-style democracy but a step
toward a potential inducement to a Park regime without Park.
With the developments of these events in South Korea,
the United States main concern was over South Korean
security. The United States was to remind the new South
Korean military leaders not to create a situation in which
the North Koreans would miscalculate that they could launch
a successful southward invasion. Should such a situation
be created, it would affect the U.S. geopolitical and
strategic position on the Korean peninsula and subsequently
the balance of power in the region.
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Whoever rules South Korea, South Korea's security
relations with the United States were and will remain
imperative, and, therefore, must "be accepted as the basis
of South Korea's very survival. Viewed in this context,
it seems unthinkable that the new South Korean military
leaders "would take a less supportive view of the American
military presence than President Park Chung Hee did."
President Carter's visit to Seoul in 1979 seemingly
marked the end of the so-called three crises in U.S.-ROK
relations— the Koreagate, the American troop withdrawal and
the human rights issue in Korea. However, due to South
Korea's continually blemished record on the human rights
issue, the Carter Administration chilled U.S. relations with
the South Korean military leadership by withholding an annual
Security Consultative Meeting in I98O. The six-month freeze
in U.S.-ROK relations imposed by the Carter Administration
came to an end when the Reagan Administration made its
position on Korea clear by placing security as unchallenged
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA'S FUTURE
In analyzing the Korean question, one ought to focus
on two important factors: both the military and political
implications. Both factors are invariably related to each
other because any satisfactory and final settlement of the
Korean question ought to be preceded by a parallel solution
to both political and military issues. What makes the Korean
question so complex and difficult was, and will remain, the
conflicting political and military interests of major actors
on the Korean peninsula--the United States, the Soviet Union,
China, Japan and, above all, the two Koreas.
The two Koreas are fully aware of this historical
dimension, the fact that Korea's geopolitical and security
position is likened to that of a shrimp among whales.
Despite their awareness of this dimension, their relationship
remains frozen, with no prospect of reaching an acceptable
agreement.
The subsequent outcome of their thorny relationship is
reflected in the endless cycle of political confrontation,
with an intermittent face-to-face dialogue between the
two sides merely repeating the stereo-type scenario,
national unification in a peaceful way. At the same time,
there is mounting evidence, in North Korea's behavior, that
it will not refrain from resorting to force of arms. All of
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this suggests that the danger of war still exists. In such
a war, the major powers in the region may be willy-nilly drawn
in for one reason or another. It is quite safe to state,
therefore, that only one actor, North Korea, is perceived as
the major stumbling block to preserving the status quo and
stability.
Under these circumstances, the role the United States
can play is twofold: both military and political. Section
one of this chapter examines the threat from North Korea
and the role of U.S. forces as a deterrent. Section two
explains suggested alternatives: 1) a peace agreement; 2) a non-
aggression pact; 3) a cross recognition; and k) a four-power or
six-power conference.
A. NECESSITY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
The most tangible indication of North Korea's intention
is found in its offensive military posture. At hearings
before a House of Representatives committee on May 25 » 1977,
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub cited the following evidence:
1) The number of tanks has increased from 500 to 2,000
over about a 4— or 5 year period.
2) North Korea had over three times as much artillery;
it had large numbers of rocket launchers that the South did
not have.
3) North Korea had twice as many combat jet aircraft,
fighter and bomber aircraft.
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k) North Korea had a large air transport fleet capable
of transporting its unconventional warfare units into the
South.
5) The North Korean navy had submarines which South
Korea did not have.
6) North Korea's continuing infiltration of agents and
personnel across the DMZ and infiltrations by sea.
7) North Korean tunnels have been discovered underneath
the DMZ. 1
As some analysts put it, it is difficult to predict the
intention of North Korea with certainty. But its deployment
posture in "attacking positioning" and its firepower super-
2iority gives it an offensive capability. North Korea's
belligerent military position was reinforced by Kim Il-song's
warning in Peking on April 18, 1975s "If revolution takes
place inSouth Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will
not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly
support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war
recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and
completely destroy the agressors. "In this war we will
only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the
country's reunification."^ The current North Korean
offensive military posture and its invariable and per-
sistent demands for national unification on its terms
are the most destabilizing factors on the Korean peninsula.
121

Major General Singlaub believed that there was no
military balance in Korea, even with the 2d Infantry-
Division there, when the troop withdrawal decision was made.
Then, one may raise the question whether the ROK force
improvement plan, if or when fully implemented, would offset
an imbalance in favor of the North. He elaborated this
way:
The 5-year force improvement plan is actually funded for
a 5-year period but the time for them to receive the
equipment and the material to be purchased by that
extends over an 8-year period. At the end of that 8-year
period they would have a higher level of balance with the
North, but that plan was not developed with any assumption
that the 2d Infantry Division would be withdrawn or that
the U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn.^
If his assessment is correct, it is quite safe to assume
that the probability of a southward invasion from the North
will be high if the U.S. combat troops are removed. With
the presence of the U.S. combat troops in Korea, the two
elements of deterrence are viable.
One element of deterrence which North Korean military
planners must recognize is a situation in which they would
have to face a powerful U.S. force stationed in between the
two classic invasion corridors if they were to attack. In
such a situation, the United States would be faced with
two alternatives: "To reinforce or to withdraw." The
probability of reinforcement being high, the presence of U.S.
combat troops constitutes a serious restraint on any reckless
behavior by North Korea.
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Another element of deterrence is the restraint both
China and the Soviet Union impose on North Korea's
adventurism. Neither China nor the Soviet Union want to
be directly involved in any conflict in Korea with the
United States. Thus, they restrain Kim Il-song from doing
what he wants to do. If the U.S. combat troops were removed,
that element of restraint would also be removed because
there would be no better justification for China or the
Soviet Union to restrain Kim's behavior.
Thus, American physical presence in Korea can be seen
as both a physical and a political deterrent. It is pre-
cisely for this reason that the North Korean news media
continuously emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Korea. Kim Il-song sees American presence in
Korea as the main obstacle to the peaceful and independent
unification of the country on his terms.
From Kim's viewpoint, the removal of U.S. troops would not
only eliminate the threat to the security of North Korea,
but would make U.S. military intervention less credible.
In such a situation, neither China nor the Soviet Unio have
any alternative but to lend political and material support
to a North Korean invasion toward the South. And Japan would
be less enthusiastic about supporting the ROK Government if
U.S. military support for that government were no longer
7
assured. Thus, Kim Il-song may reason that the removal
12 3

of U.S. troops would improve his prospects for making a
breakthrough in his showdown with South Korea.
From South Korea's viewpoint, the removal of the American
ground forces would cause Kim Il-song to play with fire out
of miscalculation. The question is how to prevent Kim from
making such miscalculation. The answer is by a "self-
reliant defense capability." It means an ability to defend
themselves on their own against an invasion launched by North
Korea alone without an intervention by its allies. South
Korea is wary of the possibility that either China or the
Soviet Union will automatically intervene in case of war.
In addition, there are other geopolitical and psychological
factors that should be taken into account. Both China and
the Soviet Union border on Korea. Both of them historically,
geopolitically and militarily have great interests in Korea.
Q
The United States lies thousands of miles away from Korea.
This geographical distance casts dought that "the survival
of South Korea will be as important to Americans as the
survival of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will
be to the Chinese and the Russians." This basic asymmetry,
as South Korea sees it, gives South Korea a sense of insecur-
ity. Thus, the presence of U.S. ground troops is important
to South Korea as a guarantee that the United States would
respond to an attack and as an effective deterrent to any
intervention by North Korea's allies.
12^

As President Park put it: "The best national security
10
policy is to prevent a war." To achieve this goal, the
ROK forces must acquire a defense capability as great as
that of those units of the 2d Division that are removed.
If not, the ROK forces would weaken its defense capability.
Even if the ROK force improvement plan is fully implemented,
the deterrence now provided by U.S. forces in Korea cannot
be replaced by any number of ROK divisions simply because
only U.S. nuclear weapons have the capability of deterring
both North Korea and its communist allies from any actions
destabilizing the Korean peninsula and region. Viewed from
this, the total pullout of U.S. ground combat troops would
adversely affect the military equation in Northeast Asia.
The removal of the U.S. 2nd Division means the removal
of nuclear weapons. Even though the security of South Korea
is protected by the "nuclear umbrella," the removal of the
U.S. 2d Division will "drastically reduce the likelihood that
the U.S. Government will feel obliged to use nuclear weapons
to defend a major U.S. military unit." As a result, it will
11
adversely affect the "credibility of the deterrence."
For these reasons, President Park's top national security
advisors told U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
staff:
We are in the post-Vietnam era and now verbal commitments
cannot do what physical presence does... the purpose of
troop withdrawal from South Korea must be seen by North
Korea as a U.S. option not to become involved in another
Asian ground war. ^-2
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President Park and other ROK leaders did not forget
what happened to South Vietnam. Uncertaintly over the fate
of Taiwan in the process of U.S. efforts to normalize its
relations with China was seen "by them as U.S. abandonment
of its treaty ally. As the only country in Northeast Asia
exposed to the threat of aggression from its adversary, they
were concerned about these developments. Their immediate
concern was a grave consequence that might arise from U.S.
military dis involvement in Korea; that is, a second Vietnam
in Korea? With this in mind, President Park told a press
conference on April 20, 1977 that the United States should
view the question regarding the American physical presence
13in "higher-dimentional" strategic terms. J President Park
saw the deterrence and defense in Korea as an integral part
of the U.S. global strategic requirements.
Four major regional powers involved in Korea are China,
Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union. All four
regard the Korean peninsula as an area of strategic importance
where their interests conflict with one another. North Korea
is allied with China and the Soviet Union on one hand, South
Korea with the United States and Japan on the other. What
this suggests to many observers is that a war in Korea would
easily bring two or more of the major powers into direct
conflict with one another. The most grave consequences of such




What all of this suggests is that the South Koreans
view the American physical presence as a credible guarantee
of UoS. response if deterrence fails. Thus, the decision
to remove the American physical presence should be made, in
the words of Ralph N. Clough, an authority on Asian affairs,
"only when other changes in and around Korea have so reduced
the risk of renewed conflict there that their presence is




After a quarter of a century of bitter political and
military confrontation, relations between the two Koreas
entered a new phase when the North-South dialogue was
announced on July k, 1972. Under the July k> joint statement,
the two Koreas agreed on three basic principles: "independence,
1
6
peace and great national unity." However, both sides have
been far apart from each other in their approaches toward
mutual reconciliation and eventual national unification.
This section will discuss briefly the North-South
dialogue that has taken place since July 1972, and analyze
the divergent viewpoints of the two Koreas and of the major
regional powers involved in Korea regarding the Korean question.
Finally, suggested alternatives will be presented.
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1 . The North-South Dialogue and the United States
As enunciated by President Park on June 23, 1972 in
his New Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, South
Korea adopted a step-by-step approach: "peace first,
17
unification later." From the North Korean viewpoint,
Park's proposal would merely freeze, perpetuate and legiti-
mize the status quo of the divided Korea by seeking
international recognition of the situation. North Korea
has maintained that the best way to remove both misunder-
standings and distrust and to mitigate increased tensions
is to solve both political and military issues first.
1
8
Specifically, North Korea proposed that:
1) The arms race and armed confrontation be ended;
2) Foreign troops be withdrawn; and
3) Both Koreas be admitted to the United Nations
under the single name of "Confederal Republic of Koryo" but
not before the establishment of "a confederation" as an
interim basis for reconciliation and cooperation.
Pyongyang's version is in sharp contrast with Seoul's
evolutionary approach. The version offered by Seoul was
envisaged as having three sequential stages: 1) the reunion
of separate families; 2) cultural and economic interchange;
\ 19
and 3) political negotiations. 7 Simply stated, Seoul
committed itself to a solution of the easiest problems first.
Pyongyang, on the other hand, insisted that the most difficult
and urgent problems be solved first to remove the state of
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military confrontation, thereby reducing the tension in the
Korean peninsula.
From the inception of the North-South dialogue, when
North Korea attacked South Korea's contention that UN forces
were not outside forces, signs of troubled surfaced. The
July k joint statement provides that national unification
should be carried out without outside interference. Evidently
Pyongyang viewed the presence of U.S. forces as an obstacle
to unification either by force or in a peaceful manner.
Probably Pyongyang expected that U.S. forces would be with-
drawn from Korea once the North-South dialogue had started.
If this assumption is valid, Pyongyang's proposal in early
197^ for direct talks with the United States may have been
motivated, as Seoul saw it, by the desire to put pressure
for U.S. troop withdrawal at an early date.
When the dialogue was unilaterally suspended by
North Korea, it proposed specifically that: 1) all American
troops be withdrawn; 2) the two sides each reduce the number
of armed forces to 100,000 or less; and 3) the present
20
armistice agreement be replaced by a peace agreement.
South Korea viewed the North Korean proposal as being meant
21
to undermine South Korea's defense capability. If a peace
agreement were signed, there would be no reason nor grounds
whatsoever for U.S. forces to remain in Korea. From the
South Korean viewpoint, such a situation would greatly affect
the military balance in favor of North Korea.
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In January 197^, South Korea proposed in return the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
22
The main contents of which are:
1) Both Koreas will not invade each other under
whatever circumstances;
2) Both Koreas will refrain from meddling in one
another's internal affairs; and
3) The present armistice agreement should remain
in force.
Obviously the theme of this proposal was peaceful
coexistence between the two Koreas until cooperation and
reconciliation could be established. North Korea viewed
this proposal as a justification for the perpetuation of
territorial division and the continued presence of U.S.
forces in Korea. In short, North Korea denounced
peaceful coexistence as a "two Korea plot." Pyongyang
wanted to remove the status quo of division and the American
presence in Korea, which Seoul wanted to retain.
When the North-South dialogue floundered, North Korea
demanded direct talks with the United States to replace the
present armistice agreement with a peace agreement. North
Korea argued that South Korea was not a signatory to the
armistice agreement and that, therefore, the situation
dictated bilateral talks with the United States. There is
little doubt that direct talks with the United States would
be an attempt by North Korea "to negotiate future security
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arrangements on the peninsula" without South Korea's
participation. The North Korean proposal was obviously
designed to isolate South Korea, precipitate U.S. troop
withdrawal and dissolve the armistice agreement without
substituting suitable arrangements to maintain peace and
stability. -'
Toward the end of 197^, the United States presented
to China and the Soviet Union what is called a cross-
recognition formula, a parallel recognition by Washington
and Tokyo of Pyongyang and by Moscow and Peking of Seoul.
This formula conforms to South Korea's open-door policy
toward any country which is ready to have diplomatic relations
with it on the basis of principles of reciprocity and equality.
In January 1975 Pyongyong denounced the formula as a two
Korea plot, although it accepts cross-recognition from
many countries.
On September 22, 1975 • Secretary Kissinger proposed
a four-party conference involving the two Koreas, China and
the United States to discuss ways of preserving the armistice
agreement and of reducing tensions in Korea. The Secretary
restated the proposal in a speech July 22, 1976. North
Korea rejected this proposal a few days later. -*




1) Urged the resumption of serious North-South
dialogue, which both sides agreed to in 1972 and which
North Korea has broken off;
2) Mas ready to take reciprocal steps toward South
Korea if North Korea's allies were ready to improve their
relations with South Korea;
3) Would continue to support dual entry of both
Koreas into the United Nations without prejudice to their
eventual unification; and
k) Was ready to negotiate a new basis for the
armistice or to replace it with more permanent security
arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties
concerned.
The Carter Administration inherited a Kissinger
formula from the previous administration, under which the
United States would not negotiate with North Korea without
South Korea's participation.
As enunciated on June 23 > 1973 > South Korea's
position is: to maintain peace on the peninsula; to continue
a dialogue with Pyongyang; to open its door to all the
nations of the world irrespective of their ideological and
political differences; and to conclude a non-aggression pact
with Pyongyang as a prerequisite to U.S. troop withdrawal.
On the other hand, North Korea's position on direct
bilateral talks with the United States remains unchanged.
South Korea will be allowed to participate in the talks
13 2

between the United States and North Korea only as an observer.
Even in that case, talks should be proceeded first between
North Korea and the United States. This policy is stated in
a statement issued by a spokesman of the North Korean Foreign
Ministry on July 10, 1979- The statement was issued in a
27
response to the U.S.-ROK proposal for three-way talks.
In its statement, North Korea denounced the simultaneous
entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations and the cross-
recognition formula as "an insidious attempt" to fix the
division of Korea by creating two Koreas.
This position was later reaffirmed by North Korea's
Premier Yi Chong-ok in his 13 July address. He characterized
the U.S.-ROK proposal for three-way talks as "utterly un-
reasonably and infeasible."
The critical point that deserves attention in the
foreign ministry statement is "whether the United States and
South Korea want negotiations for one Korea or for two
Koreas." From the perspective of North Korea, "what is the
use of the talks, if it is aimed at permanent division, not
29
reunification?" 7
The bone of contention between the two Koreas is
focused on the problems relating to military affairs and
the question of unification. The lack of progress in




1) To North Korea, the Korean question has two
aspects. One is the unification of Korea, an internal
matter which is to be solved by the Korean people themselves
without outside inteference, the other is the question of U.S.
troop withdrawal and that of replacing the armistice agree-
ment with a peace agreement, an external matter which is to
be solved between North Korea and the United States, the
actual parties to the armistice agreement. These two
different questions require two different sets of negotiation
parties. J
2) To South Korea, these two questions are
inseparable. Although South Korea is not a signatory to
the armistice agreement, it is entitled to participate to
talks related to the question of U.S. troop withdrawal and
of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace agreement
because it is one of the main actors directly involved in
Korean affairs.
Another major cause is deep-rooted animosity and
suspicion about the intentions of the other. This is
evident from the fact that both Koreas are escalating the
arms race. As a result, both parties want to negotiate
with each other from a position of strength. This
eventually leads to confrontation rather than to cooperation.
In the final analysis, the perception of threat
from each other makes the leadership of both Koreas take
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two different approaches toward a solution of the Korean
question. Their perception must be viewed from the
geopolitcal environment and psychological effect of both
Koreas
:
1) North Korea's geopolitcal proximity to its
principal allies is a great advantage over South Korea.
The security treaties North Korea signed with both China
and the Soviet Union provide for immediate assistance in case
of war. However, in Pyongyang's eyes, the presence of U.S.
forces in Korea constitutes a threat to the security of
North Korea and a stumbling block to the independent
unification of Korea as well. Therefore, Pyongyang views
the question of removing U.S. forces from Koreas as a matter
which brooks no momentary delay. This is evident from
North Korea's persistent demands for U.S. troop withdrawal.
2) The U.S.-ROK security treaty provides for
assistance in accordance with their constitutional processes.
In addition, South Korea is far away from the United States.
So far as the geopolitical environment is concerned, South
Korea is definitely at a disadvantage. Therefore, Seoul
views the presence of U.S. forces in Korea as a deterrent
to renewed conflict and a psychological support to it.
Thus, it may be safe to state that although the goal
of both Koreas—national unification--is identical, their
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approach toward that goal is conditioned by their geo-
political environment and psychological effect.
Prior to the Carter-Park call for three-way talks
,
on January 19, 1979 » President Park called for an uncon-
ditional resumption of the North-South dialogue "at any time,
31
at any place and at any level. -* For the first time in
almost six years since the rupture of talks for unification,
representatives of both Koreas resumed contact on February
17 • 1979 • After three rounds, the talks were suspended
since each side failed to attend a subsequent meeting called
for the other side.
The initial North Korean response came in the name
of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland.
32The North Korean proposal stated:^
1) Both sides should reaffirm and adhere to the
principles of the July 4 joint statement;
2) Both sides should refrain from slandering each
other;
3) Both sides should suspend all military activity
along the DMZ as of March 1, 1979; and
k) All-nation Congress should be convened in
Pyongyang in September 1979 with representatives of all
political parties and social groupings attending.
South Korea rejected this, insisting that it would
talk only with the "responsible authorities."-^ To South
Korea, the North Korean united front tactic was not
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acceptable because Seoul did not want to pluralize the
channel for the inter-Korean talks, but did want to repre-
sent all South Korean society with "one single voice"
founded on national consensus. Seoul pressed for a
resumption of the meeting of the North-South Coordination
Committee, a body which was formed in 1972 as the vehicle
for the North-South dialogue, and which Pyongyang declared
to be defunct. Thus, the talks were doomed to failure
even before that meeting.
How firmly the Seoul government adhered to the
"one single voice" formula can be seen when it was infur-
iated by a controversial statement on the deadlocked North-
South dialogue made by Kim Young-sam, president of the oppo-
sition New Democratic Party (NDP) , on June 11, 1979- In
that statement, Kim said: "I am ready to go immediately
anywhere at any time, whether it be within Korea or abroad,
to work for the peaceful and democratic unification of our
land," 3^
In Pyongyang's eyes, Kim's statement conformed to the
North Korean proposal to hold all-nation congress, undermining
the basic position of the Seoul government toward the need
for the talks between the North-South responsible authorities.
With this in mind, North Korea's reaction was quick in calling
for a "preliminary contact between the Korean Workers Party




at a time convenient to the NDP."-'-' On the other hand, the
ruling Democratic Republican Party demanded that the NDP
retract Kim's statement on the inter-Korean talks, blaming
the NDP for its "attempt to enervate the government's
enthusiasm for the national unification.
"
J
Whatever the motivation underlying North Korea's
proposal, North Korea, as observed by a Korean analyst,
was able to project its image as being postive toward the
dialogue with the South while creating the impression that
37it was the South that ruptured the dialogue in the end.
The crucial point that deserves attention was that
the incident involving Kim Young-sam's statement and the
subsequent reaction of both Koreas to it created a grave
impact on the South Korean political scene in 1979; simply
stated, a decisive, deep-seated disunity characterized by
chaos and instability. It was precisely because of this
political turmoil that the "Yushin (revitalizing) con-
stitutional system," the myth of a mighty perennial
presidency, came to an end when President Park was assassinated.
With the disappearance of this central figure from the South
Korean political scene, another crucial remaining question
was whether both Koreas would modify their position on the
question of what they believe to be the supreme goal of
the nation, national unification.
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In the spring of 1980, there were visible movements
to pave the way for a North-South Premiers' conference.
The expectation for a resumption of North-South talks was
raised when, in January 1980, North Korea's Premier Yi
Chong-ok proposed such a conference. What prompted Pyongyang
to make such a proposal is not difficult to discern. Since
Yi ' s proposal came at a time when the South Korean political
situation was quite fluid following the assassination of
President Park in October 1979 and the military coup of
December 1979 » it may be safe to assume that Pyongyang
wanted to fish in the troubled waters. From the North Korean
viewpoint, a dialogue with the Souht might create a peaceful
climate so that the South Korean military could make no
excuse for taking over the government.
Among other things, Pyongyang's use of the term "the
Republic of Korea" marked an epoch-making event in North-
South relations. The proposal also coincided with the idea
of an unconditional resumption of North-South talks "at
any time, at any place and at any level" that the late
President Park had proposed on January 19 • 1979- Given this
reconciliatory gesture on the part of Pyongyang, Seoul was
compelled to accept a new challenge from Pyongyang.
As was the case with previous talks, both sides failed
to agree even on the agenda of the proposed conference. To
make matters worse, the turbulent political upheavals in
May I98O— the Kwangju uprising, total martial law and the
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widespread arrest of potential political rivals—provided
Pyongyang with ample ammunition for propaganda. Meanwhile,
there was a series of incidents involving the infiltration
of North Korea armed agents into the South. Both sides
exchanged a barrel of charges and counter-charges. On
September 24, 1980, Pyongyang issued a statement unilaterally
suspending the talks, justifying the action as follows:
An intolerable grave situation going against the
fundamental idea of the dialogue and contradictory
to the desire of the whole nation for peaceful reunifi-
cation has been created of late in South Korea by the
new fascist rulers .. .Considering that it is meaningless
to continue the contact... we will not go to the place of
dialogue for the time being till everything returns
normal in South Korea.
3°
Then on January 12, 1981. it was South Korea which
took the initiative. In his New Year Policy Statement,
President Chon extended a formal invitation to Kim Il-song
for a summit meeting through an exchange of mutual visits.
"
The invitation to Kim was a chance for both sides to help
restore a sense of mutual trust, prevent the recurrence of
another fratricidal war, and to resume the suspended dia-
logue, thus paving the way for peaceful unification.
Pyongyang rejected Chon's proposal in a statement issued
on January 19 in the name of Kim II, chairman of the
Committee of the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland,
declaring that "Chon Doo Hwan is not a man worthy for us to
-I
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1) To apologize to the whole nation for the Kwangju
incident.
2) To release Kim Tae Jung and all other imprisoned
democratic figures.
3) To renounce the anticommunist policy.
k) To revoke the "June 23 statement" of the late
President Park which declared "two Koreas" a policy.
5) To demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
South Korea.
Any glimpse of hope that North Korea might have had
for the emergence of democratic forces in the post-Park era
was fading away. From the North Korea perspective, accepting
Chon's invitation for mutual visits would merely legitimize
the ascendancy of President Chon. It is highly improbable,
therefore, that North Korea will take the initiative as it
did in the spring of 1980 for proposing a higher-level
meeting with the South in the foreseeable future.
2. Attitudes of Major Regional Powers
The major regional powers (Japan, China and the
Soviet Union) surrouding the Korean peninsula have con-
flicting interests in Korea. Aside from their geographic
proximity there is one other thing they hold in common; their
desire to maintain the status quo. The attention of these
three powers is always focused on Korea. Each has security
interest. In addition, Korea is one of the troublespots in
the world. As noted earlier, despite the intermittent
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North-South dialogue for unification, there seems to be no
prospect for peace in Korea in the foreseeable future. The
danger of renewed conflict still remains. According to
Ralph N. Clough, whether that danger increases will depend
not only on the evolution of relations of both Koreas, but
on the attitudes of the major regional powers toward each
in
other and toward Korea. J
It is to a great extent due to its crucial
geopolitical and strategic location in Asia that both North
and South Korea have aligned themselves with major powers.
North Korea has an alliance with China and the Soviet Union
against South Korea's alliance with the United States. When
the structure of international relations in East Asia was
characterized by a bipolar system during the cold war era,
the most pressing concern of both North and South Korea was
superpower protection from a threatening enemy coalition.
Today, the structure of international relations in
East Asia is characterized by a multipolar system. Under
this system superpower protection has become less credible.
This is evident from the recent international political
trends: a disintegration of the cold-war coalition in both
the communist and non-communist blocs and changes in friend-
ships and adversary relations within each of the grand
coalitions
.
A long Sino-Soviet ideological and territorial
dispute finally led to the renunciation of the Sino-Soviet
142

security treaty. Now China has mended its fences with both
the United States and Japan. U.S. and Japan's political and
economic cooperation with China coincided with their growing
concern over the Soviet Union's growing military power in
Asia. This concern is multiplied by growing tension along
the DMZ separating the two Koreas.
Both China and the Soviet Union attach the importance
to North Korea in part due to North Korea's strategic
importance. A hostile power in the peninsula could pose a
greater security threat to Peking than to Moscow because of
geographic proximity to the peninsula to China's industrial
center in Manchuria.
a. Attitudes of China
China maintains that North Korea is the "sole
sovereign Korean state." As a result, China, in public,
opposes the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, a cross-
recognition of both Koreas and a simultaneous admission into
the United Nations of both Koreas. •* Peking's support for
Pyongyang's "one Korea" policy, however, should not be
viewed as an endorsement of a military confrontation. To
the contrary, armed conflict in Korea would merely spoil
China's grand global strategy for having the United States
and Japan as a counterweight to Soviet expansionism. In
addition, China is now preoccupied with its "four moderni-
zations" program. Its economic development must take
U3

precedence over a unified Korea under communism. Viewed
in this context, the status quo in the peninsula seems to
be essential for China's own security and economic interest
at least for the time being. If past experience is any
indication, it will not be difficult for the Chinese
leadership to realize that the presence of U.S. forces in
Korea has a stabilizing effect on the Korean peninsula. If
this argument is valid, it may not be too bold to conclude
that China is probably paying lip service to Pyongyang's
demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.
China still is a divided nation. China endorses the
"one Korea" policy as a matter of principle because China
itself has fought for the "one China" policy. It is un-
realistic for anyone to naively believe that China would
endorse the "liberation" by Pyongyang of South Korea while
seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. The
pragmatic Chinese leaders must be aware of the fact that a
precipitous change in the current status quo in the peninsula
would be tantamount to an open invitation to Moscow's inter-
vention. The unification of Vietnam, for example, is now
against China in alliance with Moscow. China simply cannot
afford to turn a unified Korea into another Vietnam, especially
when it is faced with the paramount task of the 'four
modernizations." One of the four is the modernization of
China's own armed forces into a more effective and deterrent
against the Soviet threat.

This historic Herculean task would be delayed by
draining of military weapons and equipment if China were
to be involved in another Korean conflict which it does
not want. Precisely for these reasons, it is imperative
for China to restrain both Moscow and Pyongyang; deterring
them from taking any action that would destabilize the
status quo in the peninsula. Thus, for China, the unifi-
cation issue is not one which brooks not even a momentary
delay, but is one which should be solved in a peaceful way
and in a broader timeframe. Chinese Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping's remarks on this issue eloquently bespeak
itself:
Divided countries are ultimately unified... if these
problems can't be solved in 10 years, they will be
solved in 100 years. If not in a century, then in
10 centuries. ^°
b. Attitudes of the Soviet Union
Soviet interest in Korea stems primarily from
its strategic location contiguous to both China and the
Soviet Union. In recent years, the Soviet basic policy
toward Korea is limited in scope due in part to its somewhat
cool relations with Pyongyang. Anyone who took the Chinese
side on the recent Sino-Vietnam conflict, as Pyongyang did,
is not dependable in Moscow's eyes.
Nevertheless, Moscow is not in a position to
push Pyongyang too far to the wall. If it does, the out-
come will be obvious; the fall of Pyongyang into the arms
of Peking beyond Moscow's reach.
m>5

The most basic question that has to be answered
is the reason for the incompatibility of interests between
Moscow and Pyongyang. There are a number of issues and
developments that have had adverse effects on relations
between Moscow and Pyongyang. Some issues are considered
to be more significant than others.
First, Moscow appears to be taking a lukewarm
attitude toward the issue of unification even though it
publicly advocates the North-South dialogue. Moscow's
reluctance is understandable when taking into account its
policy toward the "two Germanies." There appears to be
some differences of view between Moscow and Pyongyang on
the claim by the latter that North Korea is the "sole, legal
government" in the peninsula. On many recent occasions,
despite Pyongyang's obvious displeasure, Moscow has admitted
into the Soviet Union South Korean scholars, sportsmen,
reporters and other groups to participate in international
conferences or athletic games. Is this a signal of Moscow's
intention to tolerate, if not to recognize, the status quo
in the Korean peninsula? Donald S. Zagoria believes that
the principal cause of strain between Moscow and Pyongyang
lies in Pyongyang's fear that Moscow may yet recognize the
South Korean government, a fear reinforced by the American





In recent years, the South Korean government
has made overtures for trade and other contacts with Moscow
on many occasions. However, an improvement in such relations
seems to be a remote possibility. According to Prof. Fuji
Kamiya, as long as Pyongyang adheres to the principle of not
recognizing the two Koreas, Moscow will feel obliged to
refrain from expanding its contacts with Seoul. In other
words, Moscow, like Peking, wants to maintain the "status
quo."^9
Secondly, Moscow has found Kim Il-song an
unreliable partner, obviously because Kim took the Chinese
side on Yugoslavia, the Sino-Indian border conflict, and
the Cuban missile crisis.
Third, there appear to be some differences of
view between Moscow and Pyongyang on their approach toward
the problems concerning the future of Korea. This is
evident from the fact that Pyongyang rejected former
Secretary Kissinger's call for a 4—party conference involv-
ing the United States, China, and North and South Korea.
Moscow has not denounced Kissinger's proposal. China made
clear that it would line up squarely behind Pyongyang's
position on the Carter-Park joint proposal for a 3-party
conference. Moscow was unhappy with the proposal for fear





Fourth, Moscow, like China, supports a U.S.
troop withdrawal from South Korea. However, there is little
evidence that Moscow regards the presence of U.S. forces
in Korea as a threat to its security. Moscow has started
reinforcing its armed forces in the Far Eastern region
only after the Sino-Soviet dispute has become escalated.
There is no reason to believe that Moscow would be willing
to risk the danger of war in support of Kim Il-song's
militant strategy for unification. J
Finally, in the past few years Pyongyang has
decisively tilted toward Peking. Of all the factors affect-
ing Moscow's policy toward Pyongyang, Moscow's failure to
woo Pyongyang away from Peking is the most significant.
Moscow's discontent over Kim Il-song's pro-Peking position
was reflected when: 1) Kim's trip to Peking in 1975 was not
followed by an invitation to visit to Moscow; and 2) although
repayment of Pyongyang's debts to Moscow was rescheduled,
Moscow did not bail Pyongyang out of its financial default
on debts to Japan and western European countries.
The above issues and developments emphasize the
incompatibility of interests between Moscow and Pyongyang.
However, recent changes in friendship and adversary relations
among the regional powers surrounding the Korean peninsula
might affect Moscow's policy toward the Korean peninsula
and towards its adversaries. There is no reason to doubt
that Soviet interest in Korea has been reinforced recently
by the need to counter the formation of the Washington-
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Peking- Tokyo axis. Moscow may regard the axis as a triangular
anti-Soviet united front in Asia.
There is fear that Moscow is so hostile to the
growing triangular axis that it is "thought likely to make
efforts to disrupt it - possibly through their opposing
interests in the Korean peninsula."-^ If Moscow were to make
such disruptive moves, its passive approach supporting the
status quo on the Korean peninsula would have to be modified
to support Pyongyang's militant strategy for unification.
This will complicate Pyongyang's pro-Peking position and
Peking's policy toward Korea as well.
c. Attitudes of Japan
Today, the dominant view in Japan is that Japan's
security is inseparable from that of the Korean peninsula.
This is evident from the May 1979 Carter-Ohira joint
comminique which states that "the maintenance of peace and
stability on the Korean peninsula is important for peace and
security in East Asia, including Japan. "">-? The most signifi-
cant point that deserves attention in the joint communique
is the phrase "the Korean peninsula." This broader Korea
clause is in sharp contrast with the "ROK" clause in the
November 19&9 Nixon-Sato joint comminique. It is clear
that Sato's "ROK" clause became a broader "Korea" clause.
A shift of Japanese attitude toward the Korean
question was surfaced in 1975 when Japan declined to reaffirm
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that South Korean security was essential to Japan. The
Korea clause in U.S. -Japan joint communiques issued since
1975 should suffice to illustrate the point. The August
1975 Ford-Miki joint announcement to the press only states
that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential
to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula,
which in turn is necessary for peace and security in East
Asia, including Japan. "" The March 1977 Carter-Fukuda joint
communique also notes "the continuing importance of the
maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula
CO
for the security of Japan and East Asia as a whole. " D
What implications are there in the change in
Japanese attitudes? The answer to this question should be
sought from the context of an adjustment of Japanese policy
to the new realities of the regional environment.
The shift of Japanese policy toward Korea
coincided with the fall of Saigon in 1975* The sudden turn
of events in Vietnam created the fear that "After Vietnam,
59
it may be Korea." As if to underscore this fear, Kim II-
song made a visit to Peking on the eve of Saigon's fall.
This gave rise to speculation that a southward invasion
might be imminent. This speculation was further reinforced
by the discovery of a tunnel the North Koreans had dug
underneath the DMZ. It is not very difficult to assume that
the reverberations of these alarming events in and around
Korea were felt even in Japan for one simple reason: a
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fear of Japan's getting involved in another Korean
conflict.
In case of war in Korea, a policy of neutrality
would be infeasible, primarily because of a series of security
arrangements Japan has made with the United States under
the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The Japanese
immediate concern would be with the hightened polarization
of public opinion on the process of determining how they
f)Ci
should deal with the new situation. Domestic politics
would be focused on whether Japan, under the "prior consult-
ation" clause of the treaty, should permit the United States
to use Japanese bases to wage combat operations. Their
other concern would be with a threat not only from a unified
Korea hostile to Japan but also from one of the regional
powers which might emerge as a result of what happens in
Korea.
In any case, all of this would have an irrevocable
and destabilizing effect on both the Japanese political
scene and U.S. -Japan relations. In the Japanese context,
it is natural that as Toru Yano at Kyoto University put
it, "Japan has a stake in the maintenance of two Koreas,
rather than unification." This concept of two Koreas is
reflected in the Japanese government position supporting
the cross-recognition formula and the entry of both Koreas
into the United Nations. Precisely for these reasons, the
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dominant Japanese view on, and concern with, the Korean
peninsula was and remains unchanged: 1) what is essential
to Japan is not the security of the Republic of Korea but
rather the peace and security of the Korean peninsula in its
entirety; and 2) how to deter explosive changes from
occurring in the existing status quo on the Korean
peninsula.
The relevant question is: what can Japan do?
Tokyo has thus far taken a one-sided commitment to Seoul,
despite twists and turns that have taken place in Tokyo-
Seoul relations in recent years. Whether Tokyo's asymmetrical
commitment to Seoul will remain unchanged in the future is
a matter of uncertainty. Nevertheless, it seems that Japan's
attitudes and policy toward Korea may be significantly
influenced by U.S. policy toward Korea when taking into
account both the recent changes in the international environ-
ment in East Asia and Japanese security and economic
interests in the region.
Japan regards the presence of U.S. forces in
Korea as a deterrent to a unification adventure either by
the North and the South. Obviously, U.S. physical presence
there constitutes an insurance to Japanese economic invest-
ment. By the same token, an American decision for phased
withdrawal could well lead Japan to a more "symmetrical





One should not rule out the possibility that in
time, the close Sino- Japanese economic relation and
Pyongyang's pro-Peking position could well provide a powerful
momentum for Japan to pursue a more even-handed approach
toward Pyongyang's economic problems. In that case, from
the Japanese perspective, Pyongyang could be induced, at
least for the time being, to refrain from actions detri-
mental to a sound regional economic environment. Therefore,
it is safe to conclude that it is in the best interest of
Japan to see relations between the two Koreas and the great
powers normalized.
3. Alternative plans
A peaceful solution to the Korean question still
remains a puzzle to policy-makers. It is worthwhile to
search for alternative plans for a peaceful settlement. It
is the objective of this section to shed some light on the
two sets of proposals: 1) a multilateral guarantee of
neutrality; and 2) a four-party or six-party conference,
a. A Four-Power Guarantee of Neutrality
A four-power guarantee of neutrality for Korea's
security was a political issue during the April 1971
presidential election in the Republic of Korea. Opposition
presidential candidate Kim Tae Jung suggested that the
Republic of Korea seek a four-power guarantee for neutrality
for the Korean peninsula as a means of preventing the
renewal of war. J His proposal apparently reflected the
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general public sentiment of insecurity on the one-sided
reliance of ROK's security on somewhat dwindling U.S.
commitment.
The reasons that caused some doubts on the part
of South Koreans about the American commitment should be
sought in both domestic and international dimensions. On
January 23, 1968, North Koreans seized the American
intelligence ship "Pueblo" in the East Sea. A U.S. reconna-
ssance plane was shot down by Pyongyang on April 15. 19&9*
These two incidents, coupled with the "January 21, I968
incident" involving the attempt of 2,1 North Korean commandos
to assassinate President Park, served to alert the South.
America's non-action on these three incidents let South
Koreans wonder whether the United States would carry out
its commitment of the defense of South Korea. Insecurity
over their own security was aggravated when the United
States announced its decision to withdraw one of its army
combat divisions from Korea under the Nixon Doctrine.
The situation was compounded by cautious U.S. efforts to
accommodate with China in 1969-
At his New Year press conference on January 11,
1972, President Park described the so-called four-power
assurance of Korea's security as "an illusory concept that
64
must be strictly guarded against. " Park doubted the
feasibility of big powers' guarantee for Korea's security
on the grounds that: 1) big powers will never reach an
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agreement as long as their interests differ from one another;
and 2) even if any temporary agreement is reached, such a
guarantee can't be trusted, as shown in the Indo-Pakistan
situation.
In the heat of the election campaign, North Korean
Foreign Minister Ho Dam hinted Pyongyang's support for Kim's
66
proposal. Aside from what motivated Pyongyang to support
Kim's proposal, it seems that the concept of neutrality
did, and still does, conform, in principle, to Pyongyang's
approach to a relaxation of tension between the two Koreas.
There seems to be no concrete evidence indicating that
Pyongyang would be opposed to holding an international con-
ference for such a purpose. However, Pyongyang would most
likely insist that such a conference be preceded by an
understanding among all parties concerned to discuss two
vital issues to Pyongyang:
1) A total withdrawal of U.S. forces along with
their nuclear weapons from Korea; and
2) A simultaneous renunciation of the security
treaty signed by both Seoul and Pyongyang with their
respective allies.
As if to underscore the above-mentioned
possibility, Kim Il-song told a delegation of the Liberal-
Democratic Party from Japan on September 14, I98O that the sec^
urity treaty signed by both Seoul and Pyongyang with their




the prior condition that U.S. forces are withdrawn."
Kim added that "only a non-aligned policy would brighten
6fi
the future of the Korean peninsula."
When President Carter decided to withdraw U.S.
forces from Korea over a four to five year period, he should
have proposed some sort of neutralization of the Korean penin-
sula as an alternative to the continuing U.S. military
presence in Korea. In this connection, Professor Edwin 0.
Reischauer, an authority on East Asian affairs at Harbard
University, suggested the need for a four-power agreement
on the peninsula. He states:
Looking beyond the present problems of the U.S. defense
commitment to South Korea, the ultimate goal for the
Koreans themselves is reunification and for others, the
isolation of tensions in the peninsula from broader
international problems. We should be working toward a
four-power understanding between the United States,
Japan, the Soviet Union, and China in which all four
will recognize both Korean regimes and will not allow
developments there to involve them in conflict with one
another. In this way, Korea would be neutralized and
foreign pressures withdrawn, allowing the Koreans, on
their own, to seek reunification they all so ardently
desire. 69
One may argue that Korean neutralization can not
be institutionalized in a four-power pact so long as the Sino^
Soviet rift continues. However, it seems that in view of
the Chinese and Soviets, their security and economic
interests of converting the whole of Korea into a neutral
buffer zone may be far greater than those of preserving
the unstable status quo in the divided Korea. In view of
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Moscow's need for economic cooperation of Japan for Siberian
development, a stable neutral Korea must be as important
to Moscow as to China. In Moscow's eyes, a neutral Korea
could make Japan refrain from going nuclear. A weak Japan
would be in the best interest of Moscow unless it is strong
and pro-Moscow.
The conclusion of the Sino-Japan Treaty of Peace
and Friendship and the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations
can be viewed as a move to counter the Soviet Union. There-
fore, China can not afford to be encircled by Moscow and a
pro-Moscow Pyongyang. Viewed from this contest, Peking may
consider the neutralization of Korea to keep Pyongyang away
from Moscow. In this connection, one Korean analyst argues:
"If the 'containment' of Soviet Russia continues to be the
basic motivating factor behind Chinese foreign policy, a
four-power agreement (China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S.)
on a neutralized, independent Korea would not be unaccept-
70
able to the Chinese.'
In the Japanese view, so long as the U.S. -Japan
security treaty continues to exist, there is the danger of
Japan's involvement in another Korean War. But Japan is
not in a position to abrogate the treaty so long as it
perceives the Soviet Union to be a threat to its own security.
Going nuclear for Japan is politically infeasible because
of the nuclear-free Japanese Constitution and also because
of its domestic pressures. A conceivable alternative to
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all these factors is to see some form of unification on the
peninsula developed in an evolutionary process. In this
way, one source of war can be eliminated from the Korean
peninsula. Viewed from these salient aspects of Japanese
security interest, it seems evident that a stable, neutral
Korea would be more attractive to Japan, "with the potential
71influence of the other great powers reduced.' With this
in mind, Prime Minister Miki apparently urged President
Ford to hold talks with North Korea when the former
72
conveyed to the latter a message from Kim Il-song.
b. A Four-Party or Six-Party Conference
In September 1975» Kissinger proposed a four-
party conference including North and South Korea, the United
States and China— the parties most immediately concerned--
to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement and
of reducing tensions in Korea. He also noted that the
United States would be ready to explore possibilities for
a larger conference to negotiate more fundamental and durable
7 3
arrangements. J In August 1976, Kissinger called again for
7^
such a conference.
While responding negatively to Kissinger's
proposal for a conference, Pyongyang proposed instead
direct bilateral talks with the United States. Pyongyang
insisted upon unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command
which is a signatory to the armistice agreement. It claimed
that if the command is dissolved, the armistice agreement
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itself would cease to exist. It also demanded the unilateral
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.
Pyongyang's insistence upon direct bilateral
talks with the United States may have been motivated by
various considerations. First, Pyongyang's claim that it
is the only legal government of the Korean peninsula would
be justified. By the same token, Seoul's legitimacy and
integrity would be jeopardized. Second, the relations
between Seoul and Washington would deteriorate. Third, Seoul
would be deterred from directly dealing with Chinese rep-
resentatives. Fourth, Seoul would be unable to exercise
its veto power in the process of negotiations. From these
considerations on the part of Pyongyang, one may easily
infer its response to Kissinger's proposal for a four-party
conference.
The Kissinger proposal was hardly an incentive
to Pyongyang, primarily because his proposal sought to replace
the existing armistice with more permanent arrangements on a
new permanent legal basis rather than to replace it with a
peace agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. In
Pyongyang's eyes, his proposal was viewed as a mechanism
designed to prolong and legalize the division of Korea on
the basis of the status quo.
On the other hand, the demand by Pyongyang for
the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea was




affairs.' Seoul claimed that the presence in Korea of
U.S. forces is "an bilteral issue" between Seoul and Washing-
ton. This conflicts with Pyongyang's claim that the
question of U.S. troop withdrawal is an external matter which
is to be solved between Pyongyang and Washington, the actual
parties to the armistice agreement.
In particular, the point that deserves attention
in the Pyongyang claim is that China is not included in
discussing the question of U.S. troop withdrawal although
it is a signatory to the armistice agreement. Pyongyang
seems to reason that China lost its legal grounds for being
an effective party to the armistice agreement when the Chinese
People's Volunteers were withdrawn from Korea. If this line
of reasoning is correct, one may readily argue that once
U.S. forces are withdrawn from Korea, there would be no
reason whatsoever for the armistice agreement to exist. By
the same token, once a peace agreement is signed between
Pyongyang and Washington, as insisted upon by the former,
the Korean question would be turned into a de jure internal
affair. In that case, the United States would be precluded
from any future intervention in any internal affair of Korea.
On the other hand, China adheres to the "one
state and one government in one nation" principle. This
would make China's position very difficult to openly endorse
any formula freezing the status quo in the name of stability
and security on the Korean peninsula. On top of that, China
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competes with the Soviet Union for influence in North Korea.
It is apparent that China would be reluctant to be the first
to endorse any formula unacceptable to Pyongyang. Any
pressure by Peking on Pyongyang regarding any sensitive issue
would risk pushing Pyongyang closer to Moscow. These were
precisely some of the negative aspects mentioned by President
Park about Peking-Pyongyang relations. King Kyong Won,
former advisor of national security affairs to President
Park, was of the opinion that Peking had no influence over
Pyongyang because Peking's leaders were eager to keep
Pyongyang from going over to Moscow. He noted that this is
evident from the fact that North Korea is the only country
that both Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping have visited since
no
they came to power. If his analysis is correct, it is safe
to conclude that contrary to the rising expectations of some
quarters, the normalization of Peking-Washington relations
does not necessarily constitute a decisive factor conducive
to bringing Peking to a four-party conference.
This brings one to the question of what
alternative course of action should be taken to hold an
international conference. If the essence of international
relations is a reciprocal compromise based on a "give and
take" principle, all four big powers must, and can, find a
recipe agreeable to both Koreas. One American analyst made
79the following suggestions: 7
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1) The United States must first give a signal
to Pyongyang its interest in negotiating an agreement
which provides for the mutual reduction and pullback of
forces, and an eventual withdrawal of all U.S. forces in
Korea.
2) An offer to negotiate a U.S. military
withdrawal must be made in exchange for significant military
concessions "by North Korea.
The first item cited above coincides with the
proposal that Pyongyang has made all along. South Korea
would not be opposed to such a military accord, provided
that Pyongyang were to accept a North-South non-aggression
pact, as insisted upon by President Park, prior to a U.S.
military withdrawal from Korea. It is a well-known fact
that Pyongyang already rejected such a pact.
At the time of this writing, a group of South
Korean college professors have suggested that the ROK
Government seek "a Locarno style non-aggression pact"
involving North and South Korea, and the four major regional
powers in an effort to settle peace on the peninsula. The
professors noted that the four major regional powers should
first open reciprocal trade with both Koreas, and then
mutually recognize both Seoul and Pyongyang, creating an





Whether Pyongyang would accept such a proposal is
a matter of pure speculation. However, when taking into
account its preference for economic development, as adopted
at the October 1980 Korean Workers Party congress, North
Korea might be induced to take a more flexible attitude.
Even in that case, a U.S. military withdrawal from Korea
would most likely be seen by Pyongyang as a prerequisite.
As Professor Young C. Kim at George Washington University
put it:
The most critical factor shaping North Korea's attitude
would be whether a conference is designed to, or is
likely to result in the total withdrawal of U.S. troops
and a movement forward toward the reunification of Korea.
So long as such a conference is perceived to have been
designed to stabilize, prolong, or legalize the division
of Korea, North Korea would be opposed. 81
In sum, time is overdue for all parties involved
in Korea to determine if their policies should be redefined
to move forward toward a settlement of the Korean question.
The immediate steps to be considered are not the cross-
recognition formula nor the simultaneous UN membership
of both Koreas. The first breakthrough must be made through
a reciprocal open-door policy by all four major regional
powers toward both Koreas. But the initiative must be taken
by both Koreas to create objective conditions conducive to
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Divided "by external powers, plunged into a fratricidal
war, protected by external powers, converted into a cockpit
of East-West confrontation, the two Koreas still remain no
more secure than they were in 1953* As if to ride on the
back of the tiger, the United States has been grappling
with the Korean question since becoming deeply involved
in Korean affairs more than three decades ago. The central
and controversial issue involving U.S. security relations
with South Korean since the birth of the latter was phased
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Whenever the United
States started to talk about withdrawal, the withdrawal
issue became a bone of contention because of South Korea's
threat perceptions on the one hand and U.S. worldwide
strategic necessity on the other.
As long as the United States is committed to the
security of the Republic of Korea, there are two altern-
atives available to the United States for attaining its
goals in Korea. The alternatives are either 1) to maintain
the current level of deployment of U.S. forces or 2) to
redeploy U.S. ground troops elsewhere by expanded ROK forces.
How and when to modify a U.S. military posture depends mainly
on the military balance, a reduction in tensions and changes
in the strategic environment in East Asia. It is in this
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context that, in 1979 » the Carter Administration reversed
the 1977 troop withdrawal plan.
On the surface, there is a unanimous view that the
abnormal state of the Korean peninsula must be removed
sooner or later. Despite an intermittent North-South
dialogue, no tangible sign of progress toward that goal is
in sight because of the legacy of the cold war. There is
no enthusiastic movement toward that goal either among the
four major regional powers because of their conflicting
interests in Korea's strategic geographic location.
The United States fought for the survivial of the
Republic of Korea 30 years ago and the latter fought side
by side with the former in Vietnam. For the United States,
the Republic of Korea has become increasingly important
ally for both strategic and economic reasons. In early
1981, U.S. security relations with the Republic of Korea
ushered in a new era with full of hope and confidence
rather than despair and doubt, leaving behind the recurrent
uncertainty and anxiety that had characterized the bilateral
relationship in the past decades. This attests to the im-
portance of the Republic of Korea as a reliable U.S. ally
in time of war and peace.
Since the strategic environment in East Asia remains
volatile, the mutual interests of South Korea and the United
States demand that the stability of South Korea and the
continual undiminished U.S. commitment to South Korea's
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security are essential for the protection and progress of
their mutual interests. By the same token, as long as the
situation on the Korean peninsula remains potentially
explosive, the role that the Republic of Korea now plays
as a valued U.S. ally defending the mutual interests in
East Asia should not be underestimated. Precisely for
these reasons, it would seem appropriate to conclude this
thesis with the remarks by former Secretary Kissinger:
"Your security is not a favor which we do to Korea; it is
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